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Abstract
The first essay empirically models of aggregate fluctuations with two basic ingredients:
agents form anticipations about the future based on noisy sources of information;
these anticipations affect spending and output in the short run. Our objective is to
separate fluctuations due to actual changes in fundamentals (news) from those due
to temporary errors in the private sector's estimates of these fundamentals (noise).
Using a simple model where the consumption random walk hypothesis holds exactly,
we address some basic methodological issues and take a first pass at the data. First,
we show that if the econometrician has no informational advantage over the agents in
the model, structural VARs cannot be used to identify news and noise shocks. Next,
we develop a structural Maximum Likelihood approach which allows us to identify
the model's parameters and to evaluate the role of news and noise shocks. Applied to
postwar U.S. data, this approach suggests that noise shocks play an important role
in short-run fluctuations.
The second essay experimentally examines whether looking at other people's pric-
ing decisions is a type of heuristic, a decision rule that people over-apply even when it
is not applicable. such as in the case of clearly private value goods. We find evidence
that this is indeed the case. individual valuation of a purely subjective experience
under full information, elicited using incentive compatible mechanism, is highly in-
fluenced by values of others. As the third essay shows, this result can shed light on
price rigidities.
Inspired by the experimental results of the second essay, the third essay develops a
model of slow macroeconomic adjustment to monetary shocks. The model exploits the
idea that buyers are imperfectly informed about their nominal valuation. I proceed in
three steps. First, I develop a mechanism for price rigidities. My mechanism captures
the notion that firms are reluctant to increase prices after an increase in demand or
costs because it creates a disproportionate adverse reaction among consumers. These
reactions arise endogenously for purely informational reasons. The key assumption
is that some consumers are better informed than others about monetary shocks. If
few consumers are informed, equilibria with nominal rigidity exist. In these equilibria
3

firms do not change prices even though they are arbitrarily well informed, and have no
menu costs. Moreover, if the proportion of informed consumers is low enough, these
equilibria dominate equilibria with flexible prices. Second, I show that when firms do
not change prices they inflict an informational externality on other firms. Consumers
buy goods sequentially, one after the other, and change their beliefs about shocks
when they see prices change. Therefore, when firms do not change prices, consumers
do not learn. This hurts both firms and consumers. Third, I study the dynamic
responses of output and inflation to shocks. Because of the informational externality
learning is initially slow, the responses are delayed and hump-shaped. The responses
are also asymmetric - prices increase faster than they decrease, and therefore negative
shocks trigger larger output responses than positive shocks.
Thesis Supervisor: Olivier J. Blanchard
Title: Class of 1941 Professor of Economics
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Abstract
We explore empirically models of aggregate fluctuations with two basic ingredients:
agents form anticipations about the future based on noisy sources of information; these
anticipations affect spending and output in the short run. Our objective is to separate
fluctuations due to actual changes in fundamentals (news) from those due to temporary
errors in the private sector's estimates of these fundamentals (noise). Using a simple
model where the consumption random walk hypothesis holds exactly, we address some
basic methodological issues and take a first pass at the data. First, we show that if the
econometrician has no informational advantage over the agents in the model, structural
VARs cannot be used to identify news and noise shocks. Next, we develop a structural
Maximum Likelihood approach which allows us to identify the model's parameters and
to evaluate the role of news and noise shocks. Applied to postwar U.S. data, this
approach suggests that noise shocks play an important role in short-run fluctuations.
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Introduction
A common view of the business cycle gives a central role to anticipations. Consumers and
firms continuously receive information about the future, which sometimes is news, sometimes
just noise. Based on this information, consumers and firms choose spending and, because of
nominal rigidities, spending affects output in the short run. If ex post the information turns
out to be news, the economy adjusts gradually to a new level of activity. If it turns out to
be just noise, the economy returns to its initial state. Therefore, the dynamics of news and
noise generate both short-run and long-run changes in aggregate activity. In this paper, we
ask how aggregate time series can be used to shed light on this view of the business cycle.
We are interested in this view for two reasons. The first is that it appears to capture
many of the aspects often ascribed to fluctuations: the role, of animal spirits in affecting
demand-spirits coming here from a rational reaction to information about the future-,
the role of demand in affecting output in the short run, together with the notion that in the
long run output follows a natural path determined by fundamentals.
The second is that it appears to fit the data in a more formal way. More specifically,
it offers an interpretation of structural VARs based on the assumption of two major types
of shocks: shocks with permanent effects and shocks with transitory effects on activity.
As characterized by Blanchard and Quah (1989), Gali (1999), Beaudry and Portier (2006),
among others, "permanent shocks" appear to lead to an increase in activity in the short run,
building up to a larger effect in the long run, while "transitory shocks"-by construction-
lead to a transitory effect on activity in the short run. It is tempting to associate shocks
with permanent effects to news and shocks with transitory effects to noise.
In this paper, we focus on a simple model which provides a useful laboratory to address
two issues: a methodological one and a substantive one. First, can structural VARs indeed
be used to recover news and noise shocks? Second, what is the role of news and noise shocks
in short-run fluctuations?
On the first question, we reach a strong negative conclusion-one which came as an
unhappy surprise for one of the coauthors. In models of expectation-driven fluctuations in
which consumers solve a signal extraction problem, structural VARs can typically recover
neither the shocks nor their propagation mechanisms. The reason is straightforward: If
agents face a signal extraction problem, and are unable to separate news from noise, then
the econometrician, faced with either the same data as the agents or a subset of these data,
cannot do it either.
To address the second question, we then turn to structural estimation, first using a
simple method of moments and then Maximum Likelihood. We find that our model fits the
data well and gives a clear description of fluctuations as a result of three types of shocks:
shocks with permanent effects on productivity, which build up slowly over time; shocks with
temporary effects on productivity, which decay slowly; and shocks to consumers' signals
about future productivity. All three shocks affect agents' expectations, and thus demand
and output in the short run, and noise shocks are an important source of short-run volatility.
In our baseline specification, noise shocks account for more than half of the forecast error
variance at a yearly horizon, while permanent technology shocks account for less than one
third. This result is somewhat surprising when compared with variance decompositions from
structural VARs where transitory "demand shocks" often account for a smaller fraction of
aggregate volatility at the same horizons and permanent technology shock capture a bigger
share (e.g., Shapiro and Watson, 1989, and Gali, 1992). Our methodological analysis helps
to explain the difference, showing why structural VARs may understate the contribution of
noise/demand shocks to short-run volatility and overstate that of permanent productivity
shocks.
Recent efforts to empirically estimate models of news-driven business cycles include Chris-
tiano, Ilut, Motto and Rostagno (2007) and Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2008). These papers
follow the approach of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006), modeling news as advanced, perfect
information about shocks affecting future productivity. We share with those papers the em-
phasis on structural estimation. The main difference is that we model the private sector
information as coming from a signal extraction problem and focus our attention on disen-
tangling the separate effects of news and noise.
The problem with structural VARs emphasized in this paper is essentially an invertibil-
ity problem, also known as non-fundamentalness. There is a resurgence of interest in the
methodological and practical implications of invertibility problems, see, e.g., Sims and Zha
(2006) and Fernindez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent and Watson (2007). Our paper
shows that non-invertibility problem are endemic to models where the agents' uncertainty
is represented as a signal extraction problem. This idea has also recently surfaced in models
that try to identify the effects of fiscal policy when the private sector receives information
on future policy changes (see Leeper, Walker and Yang, 2009).
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 1 and 2 present and solve the model. Section
3 looks at the use of structural VARs. Section 4 presents the results of our structural
estimation. Section 5 explores a number of extensions and Section 6 concludes.
1 The model
For most of the paper, we focus on the following model, which is both analytically convenient,
and, as we shall see, provides a good starting point for looking at postwar U.S. data.
We want to capture the notion that, behind productivity movements, there are two
types of shocks: shocks with permanent effects and shocks with only transitory effects. In
particular, we assume that the effects of the first type of shock gradually build up over time,
while the effects of the second gradually decay over time. One can think of the transitory
component as either true or reflecting measurement error. This does not matter for our
purposes.
We also want to capture the notion that spending decisions are based on agents' expec-
tations of the future, here future productivity. We assume that agents observe productivity,
but not its individual components. To capture the idea that they have more information
than just current and past productivity, we allow them to observe an additional signal about
the permanent component of productivity. Having solved the signal extraction problem, and
based on their expectations, agents choose spending. Because of nominal rigidities, spending
determines output in the short run.
Thus, the dynamics of output are determined by three types of shocks, the two shocks
to productivity, and the noise in the additional signal. For short, we shall refer to them as
the "permanent shock", the "transitory shock", and the "noise shock". Permanent shock is
a slight (and common) misnomer, as it refers to a shock whose effects build up gradually.
Now to the specific assumptions.
1.1 Productivity
Productivity (in logs) is given by the sum of two components:
at = xt + zt. (1)
The permanent component, xt, follows a unit root process given by
Axt = p.Ax_ 1 + ct. (2)
The transitory component, zt, follows a stationary process given by
Zt = Pzzt-1 + 77t. (3)
The coefficients p, and p, are in [0, 1), and et and r/t are i.i.d. normal shocks with variances
2 and o2 . Agents observe productivity, but not the two components separately. 1
For most of the paper, we assume that the univariate representation of at is a random
walk
at = at- + ut, (4)
with the variance of ut equal to o, and restrict attention to the family of processes (1)-(3)
that are consistent with this assumption. We do this for two reasons. The first is analytical
convenience, as it makes our arguments more transparent. The second is that, as we shall
see, this assumption provides a surprisingly good starting point when looking at postwar
U.S. data. As will be clear, however, none of our central results depends on this assumption.
In general, a given univariate process is consistent with an infinity of decompositions
between a permanent and a transitory component with orthogonal innovations, as shown
in Quah (1990, 1991). In our setup, there is a one-parameter family of processes (1)-(3)
which deliver the univariate random walk (4). This is the family of processes that satisfy
the following conditions:
Px = Pz p)
a 2P) U2 a2 - ~2
for some p E [0, 1).2
Productivity may be the sum of a permanent process with small shocks that build up
slowly and a transitory process with large shocks that decay slowly (high p, small o- and
large o ), or it may be the sum of a permanent process which is itself close to a random walk
and a transitory process close to white noise with small variance (low p, large o- and small
o . An econometrician who can only observe at cannot distinguish these cases. The sample
variance of Aat gives an estimate of ou, but the parameter p, and thus px, pz, o2 and a 2, are
not identified. As we shall see, when consumers have some additional source of information
'A similar process for technology, which combines level and growth rate shocks, has been recently used in
an open economy context by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). Boz, Daude and Durdu (2008) explore the role
of different informational assumptions in that context.
2 To prove this result, notice that, in general, (1)-(3) imply
Var at] =1 a2 2
' 1 - p 2 e 1 + P z
and
2 _ J-i 1 PZ 2Cov[Aat, Aat j] = p,) 2-p for all j > 0.
Under the assumed parameter restrictions these yield Var[Aat] = of and Cov[Aat, Aat-] 0 for all j > 0.
on the permanent component xt and the econometrician has access to consumption data, he
will be able to identify p and the remaining parameters.
1.2 Consumption
We assume that consumption smoothing leads to the Euler equation
ct = E[ct+dIt], (5)
where It is the consumers' information at date t, to be specified below. For a generic variable
Xt, we use, when convenient, Et [X,} or X1t as alternative notation for E [Xr|It].
We drastically simplify the supply side, by considering an economy with no capital, in
which consumption is the only component of demand and output is fully determined by the
demand side. Output is given by yt = ct and the labor input adjusts to produce yt, given the
current level of productivity. We impose the restriction that output returns to its natural
level in the long run, namely that
lim Et[ct+ - at+] = 0.
In Appendix A, we show that this model can be derived as the limit case of a standard New
Keynesian model with Calvo pricing when the frequency of price adjustment goes to zero.
Combining the last two equations gives
Ct = lim Et[at+j]. (6)
3-400
Consumption, and by implication, output, depend on the consumers' expectations of pro-
ductivity in the long run.
To close the model we only need to specify the consumers' information set. Consumers
observe current and past productivity, at. In addition, they receive a signal regarding the
permanent component of the productivity process
St Xt v , (7)
where vt is i.i.d. normal with variance o. Moreover, consumers know the structure of the
model, i.e., know p and the variances of the three shocks.
Finally, on the econometrician's side, we will consider both the case where the signal st
is directly observable and the econometrician has access to time series for at, ct and st, and
the case where only at and ct are observed (as it will be the case in our empirical exercise).
We will use J4 to denote the econometrician's information set.
2 Solving the model
The solution to the model gives consumption and productivity as a function of current and
lagged values of the three shocks, ct, 7p, and vt. It is derived in two steps. First, we solve
for consumption as a function of productivity expectations. From equations (1)-(3) and (6)
above, we obtain
ct = xtit + P (xtit -xt-1|t ). (8)xt 1 ± - 8
Second, we derive the dynamics of the expectations in (8) using the Kalman filter. Agents
enter the period with beliefs xtp_1 and xt_1|t_1 about the current and lagged values of the
permanent component of productivity. They observe current productivity at = xt + Zt and
the signal st = xt + vt, and update their beliefs applying the Kalman filter:
xtIt xt-1|t-1 a
xt1t = A Xt_21t_1 + B (9)
t I t L -t-1
where the matrices A and B depend on the underlying parameters (see Appendix B).
Equations (8)-(9) together with equations (1)-(3) fully characterize the dynamic responses
of productivity and consumption to the different shocks. Except for two special cases to
which we shall come back below (the case of a fully informative and of a fully uninformative
signal), these must be solved numerically.
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of consumption and productivity computed using
parameters in line with the estimates obtained later, in Section 4. The time unit is the
quarter. The parameter p is set to 0.89, implying slowly building permanent shocks and
slowly decaying transitory shocks. The standard deviation of productivity growth, o-, is
set to 0.67%. These values for p and o-, yield standard deviations of the two technology
shocks, o. and o-, equal to 0.07% and 0.63%, respectively. The standard deviation of the
noise shock, o, is set to 0.89%, implying a fairly noisy signal.
In response to a one standard deviation increase in ct, a permanent technology shock,
productivity builds up slowly over time-the implication of a high value for p. Consumption
also increases slowly. This reflects the fact that the standard deviations of the transitory
shock 7t and of the noise shock vt are both large relative to the standard deviation of ct.
a. permanent shock
5 10 15
b. transitory shock
c. noise shock
5 10 15
Figure 1: Impulse Responses to the Three Shocks
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Thus, it takes a long time for consumers to assess that this is really a permanent shock and
to fully adjust consumption.
For our parameter values, consumption (equivalently, output) initially increases more
than productivity, generating a transitory increase in employment. Smaller transitory shocks,
or a more informative signal would lead to a larger initial increase in consumption, and thus
a larger initial increase in employment. Larger transitory shocks, or a less informative signal,
might lead instead to an initial decrease in employment.
In response to a one standard deviation increase in r/t, the transitory shock, productivity
initially increases, and then slowly declines over time. As agents put some weight on it
being a permanent shock, they initially increase consumption. As they learn that this was a
transitory shock, consumption returns back to normal over time. For our parameter values,
consumption increases less than productivity, leading to an initial decrease in employment.
Again, for different parameters, the outcome may be an increase or a decrease in employment.
Finally, in response to a one standard deviation increase in vt, the noise shock, consump-
tion increases, and then returns to normal over time. The response of consumption need not
be monotonic; in the simulation presented here, the response turns briefly negative, before
returning to normal. By assumption, productivity does not change, so employment initially
increases, to return to normal over time.
2.1 Innovations representation
Our assumptions make it easy to derive the innovations representation of the processes for
consumption and productivity.3 In particular, rearranging (8), we obtain
(1 - p)ct = XtIt - PXt-it. (10)
Writing the corresponding expression for ct_1 and taking differences side by side, we obtain
ct = Ct_1 + ut, (11)
with
1 p
t = _ (xtIt - xt-1t-1) - P (t-l1t - t-21t-1).
3 See Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan, and Sargent (1996) for general results on the existence of an inno-
vations representation.
Turning to productivity, equations (1) and (3) imply
at - pat_1 = xt + zt - p (Xt_1 + Zt_1)
- xt - pxt-1 + r7t.
Using (10), lagged one period, we then obtain
at = pat_1 + (1 - p) ct_1u, (12)
with
tU = Xt - xt_1it_1 - p(xt_1 - Xt-a2t_1) + ut.
To show that uc and ua in (11) and (12) are indeed innovations take expectations and
use (2) to obtain
1
Et_1[|=1 = 0,i-p
Et_1[u ] = Et_1[Et + qt] 0.
This shows that uc and U4 are innovations with respect to the consumers' information.
Turning to the econometrician, we can assume that the econometrician observes (ct, at, st)
or just (ct, at). In either case the econometrician has less information than the consumer and
the law of iterated expectations implies E[uIllt] = 0 and E[uIC] = 0. Therefore, uc and
ua represent innovations for consumption and productivity both in a reduced form VAR in
(ct, at, st) and in a reduced form VAR in (ct, at).
Note that, under our assumptions, the univariate representations of both productivity and
consumption are random walks. For productivity this follows from our assumptions on the
productivity process, for consumption it follows from the behavioral assumption (5). When
we move to multivariate representations including at least ct and at, past productivity does
not help predict consumption, but past consumption typically helps to predict productivity
as it captures the consumers' information on the permanent component xt. 4
4The special case in which consumption does not help to predict productivity is p = 0. As we shall
see below, in this case at and ct are perfectly collinear, so, given at_, ct_1 provides no extra information
on at. In this case, the innovations representation is not unique, as (12) can be replaced, for example, by
at = at-1I +u".
3 A structural VAR approach
The question we take up in this section is whether a structural VAR approach can recover
the underlying shocks and their impulse responses.
The answer to this question is, generally, no. The basic intuition is the following: if con-
sumption is a random walk given the consumers' information sets, then an econometrician
with access to the same information, or less, cannot identify any shock that has a transitory
effect on consumption based on the reduced form VAR innovations at time t. If the econo-
metrician could, so would the agents. But then they would optimally choose a consumption
path that does not respond to these identified shocks.
In the rest of this section we flesh out this intuition and show how it leads to a non-
invertibility problem. We begin from two special cases, the case where the signal st is
perfectly informative, o, = 0, and the case where it is completely uninformative, o, = 00.
In both cases, noise shocks do not affect the consumption and productivity dynamics, so we
can focus on the econometrician's problem of recovering the two shocks et and ?t from the
bivariate time series (ct, at).
3.1 A perfectly informative signal
If the signal is perfectly informative, consumers no longer face a signal extraction problem.
They know exactly the value of the permanent component of productivity, xt, and by impli-
cation, the value of the transitory component, zt = at - xt. In this case, equations (11) and
(12) simplify to:
1
Ct = Ct1 + -6t)
at = pat_1 + (1 - p) cti + Et + 7t.
Consumption responds only to the permanent shock, productivity to both. In this case,
a structural VAR approach does work. Imposing the long-run restriction that only one of
the shocks has a permanent effect on consumption and productivity, we can recover Ct and
it, and their dynamic effects.
3.2 An uninformative signal
If, instead, the signal is uninformative, the consumers rely only on current and past produc-
tivity to forecast future productivity. Then, trivially, our random walk assumption for at
leads to ct = at. In this case, the two innovations u and ua coincide and are identical to
the innovation ut in the univariate representation of at. That is, the bivariate dynamics of
consumption and productivity are given by
ct at1 + ut,
at at-i + Ut.
This characterization holds for any value of p. Thus, whatever the value of p and the
relative importance of permanent and transitory productivity shocks, a structural VAR with
long-run restrictions will attribute all movements in productivity and consumption to per-
manent shocks, and none to transitory shocks. The impulse responses of productivity and
consumption to ct will show a one-time permanent increase; the impulse responses of pro-
ductivity and consumption to Tt will be identically equal to zero.
However, in this case the decomposition between temporary and permanent shocks is
essentially irrelevant, given that no information is available to ever separate the two. We
might as well take the random walk representation of productivity as our primitive produc-
tivity process and just interpret ut as the single, permanent shock. With this interpretation,
we can safely adopt a structural VAR approach.
3.3 The general case
In the two special cases just considered, a structural VAR approach seems to work, albeit for
very different reasons: In the first, we can exploit the perfect information of the consumers
to separate permanent and transitory shocks. In the second, we can ignore the "true"
productivity process and just focus on the observable random walk for productivity.
Unfortunately, once we move away from these special cases and have a partially informa-
tive signal, a structural VAR approach fails. In the general case, unlike in the first case, the
consumers' information at time t is not sufficient to exactly recover the shocks. At the same
time, unlike in the second case, consumption reflects some information on the transitory and
permanent components of productivity, so we cannot ignore their underlying dynamics.
Now the model features three shocks, ct, 7t and vt, so we consider the econometrician's
problem of recovering these three shocks from the trivariate time series (ct, at, st). The econo-
metrician runs a reduced form VAR in (ct, at, st) and obtains the reduced form innovations
(u , up, U'). He then tries to use some identification restriction to map the reduced form
innovations into the economic shocks. An identified shock will correspond to a linear com-
bination of reduced form innovations. The next proposition characterizes the shape of the
estimated responses of consumption to any identified shock.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the econometrician observes (ct, at, st). Then, the estimated
impulse response of ct to any identified shock from a structural VAR will be, asymptotically,
either permanent and flat or zero.
Comparing this result with the impulse responses obtained in Figure 1 immediately shows
that a structural VAR will be, in general, unable to recover the model's responses to our
three shocks, given that none of them leads to a flat consumption response.
Why does the structural VAR fail? Suppose there was an identified structural shock that
could be mapped into the noise shock of the model. That means that there would be a
linear combination of reduced form innovations at time t that can be used to forecast the
transitory increase in consumption in panel (c) of Figure 1. The consumers have access to all
the data used by the econometrician to construct the innovations at time t: they know the
model parameters and they have observed all variable realizations up to time t. Therefore,
they must also be able to forecast this transitory fluctuation in consumption. But this would
violate consumption smoothing. Therefore, the consumption response to any identified shock
must be flat.
This is not a problem in the special case where consumers have a perfectly informative
signal, because in that case the impulse responses in the model coincide with the ones in
Proposition 1: permanent and flat response to et and zero response to rt. The same is true
in the special case of an uninformative signal, if we limit ourselves to recovering responses
to the shock ut. In the general case, however, the impulse responses are richer than those in
Proposition 1. Moreover, as we shall see in Section 4, the data contain enough information
to estimate these responses. The problem is that a structural VAR approach tries to get
there by exactly recovering the shocks at time t from the observables up to that period, and
this is not feasible in the general case.
Notice that our specific assumptions on the productivity process and on the informational
structure are not crucial for Proposition 1. In fact, the result can be extended to any process
for at and any signal process, as long as the consumption process is well defined and satisfies
ct = limj-+0 E [at+j |1t]-
One could enrich the model, e.g., adding preference shocks and allowing for changes in the
real interest rate, so as to relax the random walk hypothesis for consumption. However, the
essence of the argument remains: noise shocks that lead to transient "mistakes" by consumers
cannot be detected using information available to consumers at date t. A structural VAR
identification scheme can only use that information and is bound to fail.
Proposition 1 clearly extends to the case where the econometrician only observes the
bivariate series (ct, at). Given that this will be the information set used in our empirical
exercise in Section 4, it is useful to analyze this case in more detail. In particular, we can use
a numerical example to further investigate the direction of the bias in the estimated impulse
responses.
Figure 2 shows the estimated impulse responses to the shocks with permanent and tran-
sitory effects obtained from structural VAR estimation, together with the true impulse re-
sponses to the three underlying shocks. The underlying parameters are the same as for
Figure 1. The estimated impulse responses are obtained by generating a 10,000-period time
series for consumption and productivity using the true model and running a structural VAR
on it. The structural VAR is identified by imposing a long-run restriction which distinguishes
two orthogonal shocks: one with permanent effects on output and one with only transitory
effects.
Look first at the true and estimated responses of productivity to a shock with permanent
effects. The solid line in the top left quadrant plots the true response to a permanent
technology shock, which replicates that in Figure 1, namely a small initial effect, followed by
a steady buildup over time. The dashed line gives the estimated response from the structural
VAR estimation: The initial effect is much larger, the later buildup much smaller. Indeed,
simulations show that the less informative the signal, the larger the estimated initial effect,
the smaller the later build up. (Remember that, when the signal is fully uninformative, the
estimated response shows a one-time increase, with no further build up over time).
Turn to the true and estimated responses of consumption to a permanent shock in the
bottom left quadrant. The solid line again replicates the corresponding response in Figure
1, showing a slow build-up of consumption over time. The dashed line shows the estimated
response, namely a one-time response of consumption with no further build up over time.
The right quadrants show the true and estimated responses to shocks with transitory
effects on output. The solid lines show the true responses to a transitory technology shock
(thick line) and to a noise shock (thin line). The dashed lines give the estimated response to
the single transitory shock from the structural VAR. They show that the estimated response
of productivity to a transitory shock is close to the true response to a transitory technology
shock, but the estimated response of consumption is equal to zero.
In short, the responses from the structural VAR overstate the initial response of produc-
tivity and consumption to permanent shocks, and thus give too much weight to these shocks
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in accounting for fluctuations. For productivity, the less informative the signal, the larger the
overstatement. For consumption, the overstatement is independent of the informativeness
of the signal.
3.4 What if the econometrician has more information than the
agents?
The result above suggests two potential ways out, both based on the possibility that the
econometrician may have access to more information than the agents, either at time t or
later.
First, if we think of the transitory component as reflecting in part measurement error,
and if the series for productivity is revised over time, the econometrician, who has access to
the revised series, may be better able than the consumers to separate the permanent and
the transitory components. To take an extreme case, if the transitory component reflects
only measurement error, and if the revised series remove the measurement error, then the
econometrician has access to the time series for the permanent component directly, and can
therefore separate the two components. While this is extreme, it suggests that the bias from
SVAR estimation may be reduced when using revised series rather than originally published
series. ' The dispersed information model in Lorenzoni (2009) goes in this direction, by
assuming that consumers do not have access to real time information on aggregate output,
but only to noisy local information. Under that assumption it is possible to map the noise
shock in that model to the transitory shock from an identified VAR. However, also in models
with dispersed information, once we enrich the consumers' information set, the problem
raised here is bound to reappear.
The need for superior information on the econometrician's side, suggests a second way
out. In the end, the econometrician always has access to superior information, as he can
observe future realizations of variables that the consumer did not observe at time t. Then one
may hope that a combination of past and future data may be used to identify current shocks.
More formally, the traditional invertibility problem is that the map from the economic shocks
to the shocks in the VAR may not have an inverse that is one-sided in nonnegative powers of
the lag operator. Maybe adding a sufficient number of lead terms an inverse can be found?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. As we will show numerically in Section 4.5, even having
5 A related article here is Rodriguez Mora and Schulstad (2007). They show that growth in period t is
correlated with preliminary estimates of past growth available in period t, not with final estimates, available
later. One potential interpretation of these results is that agents choose spending in response to these
preliminary estimates, and their spending in turn determines current output.
access to an infinite sequence of past and future data the econometrician is never able to
exactly recover the values of the shocks.
3.5 What does the structural VAR deliver?
A different way of looking at the problem is to understand what is the correct interpretation
of the identified shocks that the structural VAR delivers. It turns out that the structural
VAR allows us to recover the process for at in its innovations representation. Namely, the
process for at can be equivalently represented by the state-space system:
it=s t1o (13)
at = pat_1+(1 - p)ht_1+v+ . (14)
To prove the equivalence it is sufficient to define it = ct, and use the results in Section 2.1,
substituting v1 for uc and v2 for un.
But then why not start directly from (13)-(14) as our model for productivity dynamics
and give consumers full information on the state it? One reason why (13)-(14) is not par-
ticularly appealing as a primitive model is that the disturbances v and v2 in the innovation
representation above are not mutually independent, and thus are hard to interpret as prim-
itive shocks. In particular, our signal extraction model implies that v1 and V are positively
correlated and that the correlation is higher the higher the value of o,. As we shall see in
the next section, this positive correlation is indeed observed in the data. Our informational
assumptions provide a rationale for it.
Going back to structural VARs, a long-run identifying restriction will lead us to identify
of as the permanent technology shock and will give a linear combination of v' and v2 as the
temporary shock. For some purposes, this representation may be all we are interested in.
Clearly, that is not the case if we are trying to analyze the role of noise shocks in fluctuations.
4 Structural estimation
We now turn to structural estimation, proceeding in two steps. For our benchmark model
structural estimation is particularly easy, and all parameters can be obtained matching a
few moments of the model to the data; thus we start with it. For more general processes
however, one must use maximum likelihood. We show how it can be done, show estimation
results for our benchmark model and compare them to those obtained by matching moments.
4.1 Matching moments
In general, structural estimation allows us to exploit the cross-equation restrictions implied
by the model to achieve identification. Equation (12), our reduced form equation for pro-
ductivity, provides a good example of this principle: estimating this equation by OLS, allows
us immediately to recover the parameter p. Moreover, o can be estimated by the sample
variance of Aat. Having estimates for p and or, we immediately get estimates for of and o .
Although identification is particularly simple here, the point holds more generally. In
the class of models considered here, identification can be achieved exploiting two crucial as-
sumptions: some behavioral assumption which links consumption (or some other endogenous
variables) to the agents' expectations about the future, here equation (6), and an assumption
of rational expectations.6
How well does our reduced form benchmark model (11)-(12) fits the time series facts for
productivity and consumption? The answer is: fairly well. Although it clearly misses some
of the dynamics in the data, it provides a good starting point.
Throughout this section, we only use time series for at and ct. We construct the produc-
tivity variable as the logarithm of the ratio of GDP to employment and the consumption
variable as the logarithm of the ratio of NIPA consumption to population. We use quar-
terly data, from 1970:1 to 2008:1. An issue we have to confront is that, in contradiction to
our model, and indeed to any balanced growth model, productivity and consumption have
different growth rates over the sample (0.34% per quarter for productivity, versus 0.46% for
consumption). This difference reflects factors we have left out of the model, from changes in
participation, to changes in the saving rate, to changes in the capital-output ratio. For this
reason, in what follows, we allow for a secular drift in the consumption-to-productivity ratio
(equal to 0.46%-0.34%) and remove it from the consumption series.7
The basic characteristics of the time series for productivity and consumption are pre-
sented in Table 1. Lines 1 and 2 show the results of estimated AR(1) for the first differences
of the two variables. Recall that our model implies that both productivity and consumption
6The use of behavioral assumptions as identification assumptions to estimate an underlying exogenous
process, connects our paper to a large body of work on household income dynamics. See, for example,
Blundell and Preston (1998), who use the permanent income hypothesis as an identification assumption to
decompose the household income process into transitory and permanent components.
7We are aware that, in the context of our approach, where we are trying to isolate potentially low frequency
movements in productivity, this is a rough and dangerous approximation. But, given our purposes, it seems
to be a reasonable first pass assumption. The reason why we concentrate on the sample 1970:1 to 2008:1 is
precisely because, with longer samples, we are less confident that this approach does a satisfactory job at
accounting for low frequency changes in the consumption-to-productivity ratio. When we turn to variance
decomposition, we will show that our results are robust to extending the sample.
should follow random walks, so the AR(1) term should be equal to zero. In both cases, the
AR(1) term is indeed small, insignificant in the case of productivity, significant in the case
of consumption.
Our model further implies a simple dynamic relation between productivity and consump-
tion, equation (12), which can be rewritten as the cointegrating regression:
Aat (1 - p)(ct_1 - at_1) + u'
Line 3 shows the results of estimating this equation. Line 4 allows for lagged rates of change
of consumption and productivity, and shows the presence of richer dynamics than implied by
our specification, with significant coefficients on the lagged rates of change of both variables.
Line Dependent Aa(-1) Ac(-1) (c - a)(-1)
variable:
1 Aa -0.06 (0.09)
2 Ac 0.24 (0.08)
3 Aa 0.05 (0.03)
4 Aa -0.21 (0.10) 0.32 (0.12) 0.03 (0.02)
5 A (8)a 0.03 (0.15)
6 A(20)a 0.31 (0.30)
7 A(40)a 0.98 (0.43)
Table 1: Consumption and Productivity Regressions.
Note: Sample: 1970:1 to 2008:1. A(j)a -= a(+j - 1) - a(-1). In parenthesis:
errors computed using the Newey-West window and 10 lags.
robust standard
Our model's dynamic implications on the relation between consumption and productivity
can be extended to longer horizons. Specifically, (12) can be extended to obtain the following
cointegrating regression, which holds for all j > 0,'
at+j - at (1- p)(ct_1 - at_1) + Ut',
8This is obtained by induction. Suppose it is true for j, that is, Et [at+j] = (1 - pj) ct + piat. Taking
expectations at time t - 1 on both sides yields
Ei-1 [at-j] (1 - pd) EtI[ct] +fp'E-1[at]
- (1 - p) ct_1 + p( p) e1 + pat-_)
= 1-p +1) ct_1 + pj+1at_1,
the second equality follows from (5) and (12), the third from rearranging.
where un" is a disturbance uncorrelated to the econometrician's information at date t. Thus,
according to the model, a larger consumption-productivity ratio should forecast higher future
productivity growth at all horizons and the coefficient in this regression should increase
with the horizon. Lines 5 to 7 explore this implication. We correct for the presence of
autocorrelation due to overlapping intervals by using Newey-West standard errors. These
results are roughly consistent with the model predictions, and all point to relatively high
values for p: the point estimates implicit in lines 3, 5, 6 and 7 are, respectively, 0.95, 0.996,
0.98 and 0.91. The maximum likelihood approach below will use efficiently all the information
in the sample to produce a single estimate of p, for now we just take the estimate from line
3, p = 0.95.
The standard deviation o can be estimated directly from the univariate representation
of at as the sample mean squared deviation of Aat, giving a point estimate o, = 0.67%.
Together with p = 0.95, this implies o, = 0.03% and o., = 0.65%. In words, these results
imply a very smooth permanent component, in which small shocks steadily build up over
time, and a large transitory component, which decays slowly over time.
Recovering the variance of the noise shock is less straightforward, but it can be done
matching a different moment: the coefficient of correlation between the reduced form inno-
vations u' and ua. In particular, numerical results show that, given the remaining parameters,
this moment is an increasing function of o,. Therefore, we recover this parameter by match-
ing the correlation in the data. The coefficient of correlation between Ac and the residual
of the regression on line 3 (corresponding, respectively to u' and Uz) is equal to 0.52. If the
signal was perfectly informative this correlation would be equal to 0.05, while if the signal
had infinite variance it would be 1.' Therefore, the observed correlation is consistent with
the model and yields a fairly large standard deviation of the noise shock, o, = 2.1%.
The fact that we are able in our benchmark model to recover all the model parameters by
matching a few moments from the data, is clearly a special case. It is thus useful to develop a
general approach, which can be applied to any specification of productivity or consumption
behavior. We now discuss this approach, and then return to the data.
9These bounds can be derived from the analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. To obtain the first, some algebra
shows that under full information Co'v[i., u-]/ Var[un]Var[] = (1-p)/ F(1 - p)2 + p. The second bound
is immediate.
4.2 Maximum Likelihood
To estimate a model where consumers face a non trivial signal extraction problem, one can,
generally, proceed in two steps. 10
" Take the point of view of the consumers. Write down the dynamics of the unobserved
states in state space representation and solve the consumers' filtering problem. In our
case, the relevant state for the consumer is given by t -_ (xt, xt_1, zt), its dynamics are
given by (2) and (3), the observation equations are (1) and (7), and Kalman filtering
gives us the updating equation (9).
* Next, take the point of view of the econometrician, write down the model dynamics
in state space representation and write the appropriate observation equations (which
depend on the data available). In our case, the relevant state for the econometrician
is given by (t - (xt, xt_1, zt, xtt, xt1t, ztt). Notice that the consumers' expectations
become part of the unobservable state and the consumers' updating equation (9) be-
comes part of the description of the state's dynamics. The observation equations for the
econometrician are now (1) and (10), where the second links consumption (observed by
the econometrician), to consumers' expectations. The econometrician's Kalman filter
is then used to construct the likelihood function and estimate the model's parameters.
Table 2 shows the results of estimation of the benchmark model presented as a grid
over values of p from 0 to 0.99.11 For each value of p, we find the values of the remaining
parameters that maximize the likelihood function and in the last column we report the
corresponding likelihood value. The table shows that the likelihood function has a well-
behaved maximum at p = 0.89, on line 6. The corresponding values of o and a. are 0.07%
and 0.63%, respectively. The standard deviation of the noise shock a, is 0.89%.
Relative to the moment matching approach in Section 4.1, the Maximum Likelihood
approach uses all the implicit restrictions imposed by the model on the data generating
process. This explains the difference between the estimates on line 6 of Table 2 and those
obtained in Section 4.1. In particular, the Maximum Likelihood approach favors smaller
values of p and a,. However, if we look at line 8 of Table 2, we see parameters much closer
10More detailed derivations are provided in Appendices B and D.
"For all our Maximum Likelihood estimates we used Dynare (v.3), which allows for the use of matrices in
the model section of the code. Our observables are first differences of labor productivity and consumption,
so we use a diffuse Kalman Filter to initialize the variance covariance matrix of the estimator (a variance-
covariance matrix with a diagonal of 10).
Line p o o-, a (ML
1 0.00 0.0067 0.0067 0.0000 0.0089 -3 * 1012
9 0.25 0.0183 0.0137 0.0092 0.0000 859.2
3 0.50 0.0102 0.0051 0.0072 0.0000 980.5
4 0.70 0.0077 0.0023 0.0065 0.0026 1042.6
5 0.80 0.0071 0.0014 0.0064 0.0056 1064.5
6 0.89 0.0067 0.0007 0.0063 0.0089 1073.2
7 0.90 0.0067 0.0007 0.0064 0.0099 1073.1
8 0.95 0.0068 0.0003 0.0066 0.0234 1072.2
9 0.99 0.0063 0.0001 0.0063 0.0753 1068.5
Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Benchmark Model
to those in Section 4.1 and the likelihood gain from line 8 to line 6 is not too large. In other
words, the data are consistent with a range of different combinations of p and o-. When
we look at the model's implications in terms of variance decomposition, we will consider
different values in this range.
A simple exercise, using this approach, is to relax the random walk assumption for
productivity, allowing px to differ from p2, and allowing the variances of the shocks to be
freely estimated. The estimation results are reported in Table 3 and are quite close to those
obtained under the random walk assumption.
Estimate Standard error
Px 0.8879 0.0478
Pz 0.8878 0.0474
o- 0.0065 0.0004
a 0.0007 0.0003
av 0.0090 0.0052
ML 1073.3
Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Unconstrained Model
4.3 Variance decomposition
What do our results imply in terms of the dynamic effects of the shocks and of variance
decomposition? If we use the estimated parameters from the benchmark model (line 6
in Table 2), the dynamic effects of each shock are given in Figure 1 and were discussed in
Section 2: A slow and steady build up of permanent shocks on productivity and consumption;
productivity
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Figure 3: Variance Decomposition: Benchmark Model
a slowly decreasing effect of transitory shocks on productivity and consumption; and a slowly
decreasing effect of noise shocks on consumption.
Figure 3 presents the variance decomposition, plotting the contribution of the three
shocks to forecast error variance, from 1 to 20 quarters ahead. The main result is that noise
shocks are an important source of short run volatility, accounting for more than 70% of
consumption volatility at a 1-quarter horizon and more than 50% at a 4-quarter horizon,
while permanent technology shocks play a smaller role, having almost no effect on quarterly
volatility and explaining less than 30% at a 4-quarter horizon. It is interesting to compare
this result to traditional SVAR exercises, such as Shapiro and Watson (1989) and Gali
(1992), where demand shocks typically explain a smaller fraction of aggregate volatility and
permanent technology shocks play a bigger role. The analysis in Section 3 helps to explain
these differences, by showing that, asymptotically, a SVAR is biased towards assigning 100%
of the volatility to the permanent shock.
In Table 4, we report the results of some robustness checks. On each line, we report the
fraction of consumption variance due to the noise shock at a 1, 4 and 8-quarter horizon, for
different parameter values. Line 1 corresponds to our benchmark estimation. Line 2 reports
the results obtained by setting p at a higher level and choosing the remaining parameters by
maximum likelihood (line 8 of Table 2). The variance decomposition at short horizons is not
very different, but noise shocks turn out to be more persistent under this parametrization
and explain a much bigger fraction of variance at a 8-quarter horizon. On line 3 we report
the parameters obtained when estimating our model on a longer sample, 1948:1 to 2008:1.
With this data set the estimate of p is larger and we obtain results analogous to the ones on
line 2.
Finally, in lines 4 and 5 we experiment with changing only the volatility of noise shocks,
keeping the other parameters fixed. In particular, relative to the benchmark, we first decrease
and then increase a, by one standard deviation (which is 0.0034 in our maximum likelihood
estimate). Interestingly, it is the lower value of or that leads to the largest amount of noise-
driven volatility. A lower o, makes the signal st more precise, so consumers rely on it more.
In our range of parameters, this leads to greater short-run volatility.
Line Parameters Noise-driven variance (fraction)
p as (T 1 Quarter 4 Quarter 8 Quarter
1 benchmark 0.89 0.0067 0.0089 0.75 0.53 0.23
2 high p 0.95 0.0068 0.0234 0.71 0.68 0.58
3 sample 1948:1-2008:1 0.96 0.0099 0.0382 0.73 0.71 0.64
5 low or, 0.89 0.0067 0.0055 0.82 0.46 0.17
4 high o, 0.89 0.0067 0.0123 0.68 0.53 0.26
Table 4: Variance Decomposition: Robustness Checks
4.4 Recovering the states: retrospective history
So far we have focused on using structural estimation to estimate the model's parameters.
Now we turn to the question: what information on the unobservable states and on the shocks
can be recovered from structural estimation? We begin from the states.
Using the Kalman smoother it is possible to form Bayesian estimates of the state vector
( using the full time series available and obtain a retrospective history of the U.S. business
cycle. The top panel of Figure 4 plots estimates for the permanent component of productivity
xt obtained from our benchmark model. The solid line correspond to xt, the dashed line to
the consumers' real time estimate of the same variable xtt. Notice that both xt and xtIt are
unobservable states for the econometrician, so the two lines correspond to the "smoothed"
estimates of the respective state (see Appendix D).
Looking first at medium-run movements, the model identifies a gradual adjustment of
consumers' expectations to the productivity slowdown in the 70s and a symmetric gradual
adjustment in the opposite direction during the faster productivity growth after the mid
90s. Around these medium-run trends, temporary fluctuations in consumers' expectations
produce short-run volatility.
To gauge the short-run effects of expectational errors, however, the consumers' expec-
tations of xt are not sufficient, given that consumers project future growth based on their
expectations of both xt and xt1. For this reason, in the bottom panel of Figure 4, we plot
the smoothed series for the consumers' real time expectations regarding long-run produc-
tivity, xt+oo1t = (xtlt - Pxt-it)/(1 - p), and compare it to the smoothed series for xt+o .
The model generates large short-run consumption volatility out of temporary changes in
consumers' expectations of future productivity. Some times these changes occur when con-
sumers' overstate current xt (e.g., at the end of the 80s), other times when consumers slowly
catch up to an underlying productivity acceleration and understate xt_1 (e.g., at the end
of the 90s). Obviously, the model is too stylized to give a credible account of all cyclical
episodes. For example, given the absence of monetary policy shocks the recession of 1981-82
is fully attributed to animal spirits.
The Kalman smoother also tells us how much information on the unobservable states is
contained in past and future data. In particular, in Figure 5 we plot the root mean squared
errors (RMSE) of the smoothed estimates of xt and zt, when data up to t+j are available, for
j = 0, 1, 2, .... Formally, these RMSE correspond to the square root of Et+j[(xt - Et+j[Xt])2),
and can be computed using two different information sets: the econometrician's, which only
includes observations of ct and at, and the consumer's, which also includes st. For simplicity,
we compute RMSE at the steady state of the Kalman filter, that is, assuming the forecaster
has access to an infinite series of data, from -oo to t + j. In this case, the econometrician's
information set coincides with the consumer's, that is, the econometrician can back up the
current value of st perfectly from current and past observations of ct and at. This is a
numerical result: computing the RMSE of st from the econometrician's Kalman smoother,
we find that it is equal to zero at j = 0. This implies that, in our model, with a sufficiently
long data set, the direct observation of st does not add much to the econometrician's ability
to recover the unobservable states (or the shocks).
Figure 5 shows that the contemporaneous estimate of the current state xt has a standard
deviation of 0.44%. By using future data, this standard deviation almost halves, to 0.28%.
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However, most of the relevant information arrives in the first six quarters, after that, there
are minimal gains in the precision of the estimate.
4.5 Recovering the shocks: more on invertibility
Turning to the shocks, we know from our discussion of structural VARs that the information
in current and past values of ct and at is not sufficient to derive the values of the current
shocks. However, this does not mean that the data contain no information on the shocks.
In particular, using the Kalman smoother the econometrician can form Bayesian estimates
on Et, rt, and vt using the entire time series available. Figure 6 plots these estimates for
our benchmark model. As for the states, in Figure 7 we report the RMSE of the estimated
shocks as a function of the number of leads available. To help the interpretation, each RMSE
is normalized dividing it by the ex ante standard deviation of the respective shock (o, oa,
and a,).
Notice that if the model was invertible, the RMSE would be zero at j = 0. The fact
that all RMSE remain bounded from zero at all horizons shows that even an infinite data
set would not allow us to recover the shocks exactly.
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Figure 7: Normalized RMSE of the estimated shocks at time t using data up to t + j
The transitory shock r/t is estimated with considerable precision already on impact and
the precision of its estimate almost doubles in the long run. The noise shock Vt is less
precisely estimated, but the data still tell us a lot about it, giving us an RMSE which is
about 1/3 of the prior uncertainty in the long run. The shock that is least precisely estimated
is the permanent shock ct. Even with an infinite series of future data, the residual variance
is about 94% of the prior uncertainty on the shock.
How do we reconcile the imprecision of the estimate of et with the fact that we have
relatively precise estimates of the state xt, as seen in Figure 5? The explanation is that
the econometrician can estimate the cumulated effect of permanent productivity changes by
looking at productivity growth over longer horizons, but cannot pinpoint the precise quarter
in which the change occurred. Therefore, it is possible to have imprecise estimates of past
Ct's, while having a relatively precise estimate of their cumulated effect on xt. This also helps
to explain the high degree of autocorrelation of the estimated permanent shocks in Figure
6. The smoothed estimates of ct in consecutive quarters tend to be highly correlated, as the
econometrician does not know to which quarter to attribute an observed permanent change
in productivity. Notice that the autocorrelation of the estimated shocks is not a rejection of
the assumption of i.i.d. shocks, but purely a reflection of the econometrician's information.
In fact, performing the same estimation exercise on simulated data delivers a similar degree
of autocorrelation as the one obtained from actual data.
5 Extensions
We have shown how models where agents face signal extraction problems cannot be estimated
through SVARs, but can be estimated through structural estimation. Structural estimation
however requires a full specification of the model, including the processes for the perma-
nent and transitory components of productivity, the information structure, the behavior of
consumers. And, unfortunately, the estimated parameters are likely to be sensitive to the
specific assumptions.
There are at least two dimensions in which we think our benchmark model needs to be
extended.
The first is motivated by the data. As we saw from Table 1, the dynamics of consump-
tion and the dynamic relation between productivity and consumption are richer than those
implied by the benchmark. These require at least a modification of our assumptions about
consumption behavior. Our assumption about consumption implies that consumption fol-
lows an exact random walk for any productivity process and any standard deviation of the
noise in the signal. As we have seen however, the univariate process for consumption, on
line 2 of Table 1, shows evidence of richer dynamics.
Here we try two approaches. The first is to allow for some time variation in the real
interest rate by turning to a standard New Keynesian model with Calvo pricing. Such a
model is described in Appendix A and leads to a process for consumption (and output) of
the form
Ct diat + d2xtlt + d3xtt_1 + d4ztlt (15)
where the coefficients d are non-linear functions of the following model parameters: the
discount factor 3, a parameter <, reflecting the response of the nominal interest rate to
inflation in the monetary policy rule, and a parameter K, capturing the degree of nominal
and real rigidities in price setting. We set # at 0.99 and estimate the remaining parameters
by Maximum Likelihood, following the same steps laid out in 4.2. The results are reported
in Table 5.
Estimate Standard error
K 0.0011 0.0004
6 1.4436 0.1403
p 0.8780 0.0225
o] 0.0067 0.0004
o 0.0065 0.0019
Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimation: standard New Keynesian model
Notice that the data prefer a very low value for r,, so the implications of the New Keyne-
sian model are very close to those of the benchmark model. In particular, the implied values
of the coefficients in (15) are
d = 0.0016, d2= 7.9250, d3 =-6.9266, d4 = 0.0359,
while, in our benchmark model, given the same p = 0.878, the corresponding values would
be d2 =1/(1 - p) = 8.1967, d3 = -p/(1 - p) = -7.1967 and zeros for di and d4 .
To capture slow consumption adjustment, we then try an alternative specification of
consumption behavior, which incorporates a simple backward looking element (a stylized
form of habit):
ct = 6Ct-1 + (1 - 6) lim Et[atj].
Imrioo
In Table 6 we report the results from estimating this variant of the model, presented as a grid
search over the value of the adjustment parameter 6. The data seem to prefer a small but
positive value of 6, which helps to account for the positive autocorrelation in the univariate
process for consumption growth (see Table 1, line 2).
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Table 6: Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Slow Consumption Adjustment
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Table 7: Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Labor hoarding
Our second extension is motivated by the discussion of labor hoarding and pro-cyclical
productivity in the research on the relation between output and employment. Our bench-
mark model has assumed that labor productivity is exogenous; there is however substantial
evidence that some of the movements in productivity are in fact endogenous. Thus, in con-
trast to our assumption, a positive realization of the noise shock may lead consumers to
spend more, and lead in turn to an increase in productivity.
To capture endogenous responses of productivity, we extend the model by assuming that
the process at captures the exogenous component of productivity, while actual productivity,
denoted by dt, responds to increases in employment according to the relation:
dt = at + a(ct - at).
Table 6 displays the Maximum Likelihood estimation for this case, as a grid over values for
a. In this case, the model fits the data better with no endogenous productivity responses,
i.e., with a = 0. However, the likelihood is relatively flat for low levels of a. Notice that, in
that region, the model compensate for higher values of a, by choosing lower estimates for os,.
To interpret this result, remember from Section 4.1 that higher values of o are associated to
a higher coefficient of correlation between the innovations of consumption and productivity
uc and Ua. Allowing for endogenous productivity, gives us an alternative channel to explain
this correlation. The results in Table 6 show that, having only data on consumption and
observed productivity, it is hard to distinguish the role of these two channels.
6 Conclusions
On the methodological side, we have explored the problem of estimating models with news
and noise-which we think provide an appealing description of the cycle. We have shown the
limits of SVAR estimation, and shown how these models can be estimated with structural
methods. This implies that to identify the role of news and noise in fluctuations one must
rely more heavily on the model's structure. In this paper, a central role for identification
was played by the consumer's Euler equation, that is, by the assumption that current move-
ments in consumption are primarily driven by changes in the consumers' expectations on
the economy's lung run potential.
On the empirical side, the data appear quite consistent with a view of fluctuations where
the pattern of technological change is smooth, subject to random shocks which only build
up slowly, while most of the short-run action in consumption and output comes from noisy
information on these long-run trends. Clearly, we need to extend the model in many dimen-
sions before having confidence in these conclusions. In particular, adding investment seems
an essential step in building models of the business cycle driven by anticipations.
Another natural extension is to add variables to the empirical exercise, to better capture
consumers' expectations about the future. For example, one could include financial market
prices, as Beaudry and Portier (2006), or survey measures of consumer confidence, as Barsky
and Sims (2008). However, the analysis in Section 3, where we allowed the econometrician
to directly observe all the signals observed by the consumers, shows that adding variables is
not sufficient, in general, to solve the identification problems of SVARs.
Finally, it is useful to notice that the applicability of SVAR methods depends crucially
on the way in which one models the information structure. In models where the consumer
exactly observes shocks which will affect productivity in the future, invertibility problems
may be less damning (see our comments in Section 3.5 and the analysis in Sims (2009)).
However, we think that, in many instances, signal extraction models provide a more realistic
and flexible description of the informational environment. When dealing with these models,
the researcher can choose, depending on the question at hand, either to limit attention to
the innovation representation of the consumers' forecasting problem or to take the structural
approach developed here.
Appendix A. Relation of the model with the standard New Key-
nesian model
Consider a standard New Keynesian model, as laid out, e.g., in Gali (2008). Preferences are
given by
EZ/ O'U (Ct, Nt) ,
t=o
with
U (C, N) = log Ct - 1 ,
where Nt are hours worked and C is a composite consumption good given by
/1 _Y-1 \ Y
Ct = (1 C1 dj) ,
Cj,t is the consumption of good j in period t, and -y > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
among goods. Each good j E [0, 1] is produced by a single monopolistic firm with access to
the linear production function
Yt = AtNjt. (16)
Productivity is given by At = exp at and at follows the process (1)-(3). Firms
reset prices only at random time intervals. Each period, a firm is allowed to
with probability 1 - 0 and must keep the price unchanged with probability
labor on a competitive labor market at the wage Wt, which is fully flexible.
Consumers have access to a nominal one-period bond which trades at the
consumer's budget constraint is
are allowed to
reset its price
0. Firms hire
price Qt. The
1 1QtBt+1 + InP,tCj,tdj = Bt + WNt + Il g1,tdj, (17)
where Bt are nominal bonds' holdings, P,t is the price of good j, Wt is the nominal wage
rate, and Hj,t are the profits of firm j. In equilibrium consumers choose consumption, hours
worked, and bond holdings, so as to maximize their expected utility subject to (17) and a
standard no-Ponzi-game condition. Nominal bonds are in zero net supply, so market clearing
in the bonds market requires Bt = 0. The central bank sets the short-term nominal interest
rate, that is, the price of the one-period nominal bond, Qt. Letting it - log Qt, monetary
policy follows the simple rule
it = 1* + #7t,7 (18)
where i* = - log 3 and # is a constant coefficient greater than 1.
Following standard steps, consumers' and firms' optimality conditions and market clear-
ing can be log-linearized and transformed so as to obtain two stochastic difference equations
which characterize the joint behavior of output and inflation in equilibrium. After substi-
tuting the policy rule we obtain:
yt Et [yt+1] - #7rt + Et [rt+1]l,
7rt = (yt - at) + #Et [7rt+1] ,
where r = (1 + () (1 - 6) (1 - #0) /0 and where constant terms are omitted. As long as
# > 1 this system has a unique locally stable solution where yt and 7rt are linear functions
of the four exogenous state variables at, xtIt, xt_1it, ztIt,
at(ye = D( .77TtXt-ift3
The matrix D, can be found using the method of undetermined coefficient as the solution
to
0 1+p -p p
[2K 0 0 0 0 ] [1 1 0 O1+p -p 0
-K 1 -s0 0 0 0 #3 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 p
The elements of D, are a continuous non-linear function of K and some lengthy algebra
(available on request) shows that
limD. -1 0 1-p 0lim DK = I[ 7Sice~Ko 1 -p w 0 0 0 0 
SinceK --+ 0 when 0 -+ 1, this completes the argument.
Appendix B. Consumers' Kalman filter
Define the matrices
1+ Px
1
0
and Eil
-px
0
0
0
0
o12
0 0
0 0
0
0
Pz
,
Then the process for dt - (xt, xt_1, zt) is described compactly as
6= Ct_1 + (E,0,r)',
and the observation equation for the consumers is
(at, st)' = Dt + (0, Vt)'.
Let P - VartI [(t]. The value of P is found solving the equation
P = C (P - PD' (DPD'+ E2) DP] C'+ E1 .
The matrixes A and B in the text are then given by:
A = (I-BD)C,
B = PD'(DPD'+E2) 1 .
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 1
Let wt be an identified shock, corresponding to a linear combination of current and past
observables. Applying the law of iterated expectations we get
E ct+ k, I t)-1] = E [lim E [at+k+jt+k]|IWt, It"-1] =lim E at+jIt, IZ-1_,
for all k > 0 and, similarly,
E [ctkt-1] = lim E [at+jI -Ij-tsoo i se
It follows that the response of consumption to wt is constant and equal to
- E -cI-"_1 = lim E [at+jlwt,1g-1j---oo - lim E at+jII-1j -+oo0
for all k > 0.
Appendix D. Econometrician's Kalman Filter
The econometrician's state vector is given by
(? -- (xt, xt_1, zt, xtit, xt-ig,) zip.
Rewrite the dynamics of the vector of consumer expectations (xtlt, xt_11t, ztit), from (9), as
follows:
xtIt1
Ztlt
z x_1p_1 1Xt-ift1[Zt-~i t-iI
+B et +
+ B 1+ pX+ B -p p
-px 0 -
01I V t .
Xt-2
zt_1
I+
Then the state (? evolves according to:
-t = Q 1, + R (ert, t)'.
where the matrices Q and R are given by
+ Px -Px 0
1 0 0 0
Q 0 0 Pz
B 1+ PX -Px Pz A
1+ px -px 0
(19)
rqt + B
E 1ct+kjst, It-j1
1 0 0
0 0 0
R =0 1 0
B 1 0 0 + B 0 1 0 + B 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
When the econometrician can observe (at, ct), the observation equation is, in matrix form,
(at, ct)' = TXt, (20)
where
T= 1 0 1 0 0 00 0 0 1 ---T-- 01-p2, 1-p:, .
The econometrician's filtering problem can then be solved from (19)-(20). The case in which
the econometrician can also observe st is treated in a similar way. This filter can be used
both to compute recursively the likelihood function and to derive smoothed estimates of the
unobservable states in t, as in Section 4.4. Expanding the state space to include the shocks
(Ct, rt, Vt), it is easy to compute their smoothed estimates, as in Section 4.5.
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Abstract
In this paper we experimentally examine whether looking at other people's pricing decisions
is a type of heuristic, a decision rule that people over-apply even when it is not applicable .
such as in the case of clearly private value goods. We find evidence that this is indeed the case
. individual valuation of a purely subjective experience under full information, elicited using
incentive compatible mechanism, is highly influenced by values of others. This result can shed
light on price behavior, price rigidities and rents.
Keywords: second price auction, heuristic.
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Introduction
In many real-life situations before we make our own decisions it is useful to look at what others
have done when they were facing similar situations. For instance, when considering a job offer
we might consult others who recently accepted or rejected a related job offer. When purchasing
an apartment we might seek information about what prices were paid recently for similar
apartments, and if possible in the same vicinity or even the same building.
This general strategy is often a very useful one, as many, if not most, of the situations we
encounter include some component of common values. This means that relying on others'
decisions, or the prices they are willing to pay, can be helpful for our decisions, as they convey
some relevant information. However, although this strategy is often a good one, at times
applying it can be inappropriate. One notable example where following others is inappropriate is
information cascades, where individuals fail to realize the information externality of their
actions (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Simonsohn and Ariely,
2008). Another is Asch's famous "line" experiment (Asch 1951) demonstrating that even in
visual judgments the majority can influence individuals, which is common in a range of social
behaviors (See Petty and Wegener 1998 for a survey).
In this paper we examine if relying on the behaviors of others can also occur in the case of
pricing decisions for goods that are private values goods. Specifically, we ask whether looking at
other people's pricing decisions is a type of heuristic, a decision rule that people over-apply even
when this information is not applicable -- such as in the case of clearly private value goods. We
provide experimental evidence showing that bids in private-value auctions indeed depend on
the bids provided by others -- a relationship we expect to find in common-value but not in
private-value auctions.
To ensure purely private value situations and full information we use a novel hedonic stimulus --
annoying sounds. This type of experience provides us with an experience that is direct, hedonic,
providing participants with full information, and importantly it is the type of experience that has
no externalities and no possible trade. Elicitation of values in our experiment is done using an
incentive-compatible mechanism, either BDM procedure (in stage 1 of the experiment) or a
second- price auction (in stage 2 of the experiment). We find that subjective values, or bids, are
interrelated in the sense that observing others' past bids had a statistically significant effect on
the bids participants submitted.
One implication of these results is that figuring out how much we are willing to pay, even for
simple experiences, may be more complex, or less readily available, than we usually consider. As
a consequence of this complexity we over-apply the strategy of using others' behavior and use it
as an input for our decisions. This tendency may explain some anomalous price behavior and
fashion trends.
The Experiment
To make the point that participant's values are interrelated even in situation of private values
with perfect information, no externalities and with no trade, we recruited 45 MIT students.
There were two stages to the experiment, with ten rounds each; in both stages, and in all
rounds, participants bid for listening to an unpleasant tone over a headset. We used this
artificial hedonic "good" for the following reasons: (1) we were able to provide subjects with a
sample of the tone before they subsequently placed their bid, and as a result create a perfect
information situation, (2) this is a purely subjective and personal experience, (3) there are no
externalities, (4) there are no trading possibilities, and (5) to avoid a situation in which subjects
could solve the pricing problem drawing on their own experiences. Unpleasant tones are not
traded in the marketplace, so our subjects could not refer to similar decisions made outside the
laboratory as a basis for their valuation. These aspects of the stimuli enable us to focus on the
effect we are interested in, if exists (the procedure is similar to Ariely et al (2003)).
In the experiment we had two stages: in stage 1 we recorded actual bids of a first group of
participants. These bids where then used in stage 2 to study their influence on a second group of
participants.
Stage 1
Upon arrival to the lab, at the beginning of stage 1, we explained that the study involves bidding
and listening to high-pitched sound. We then explained the bidding procedure - the BDM
(Becker et al 1964) procedure - a second price auction against a random number. In our
particular case the random number was drawn for a uniform distribution between 5 cents and
95 cents. According to this procedure, if a subject's bid was lower than the number drawn, the
subject would win the auction - he would listen to the sound and get paid the random number
drawn. Otherwise, he would not listen to the sound, and would not get paid. This procedure was
explained in detail before the start of the experiment, and we stressed its incentive
compatibility property, including a few examples to show that bidding one's true value is the
optimal strategy. Then, subjects listened to the sound on their headphones for 10 seconds, and
immediately after this first experience with the tone, participants were asked to bid. That is to
state the minimum amount of money they demand in order to listen to the same tone again
(Willingness to Accept or WTA). This pricing procedure was repeated nine times (ten trials).
Table 1 below presents summary statistics of bids on each trial.
[Table 1 here]
Selection
Out of the 22 participants in stage 1, 17 bidders expressed consent to use their bids in future
auctions; of these 17 participants we retained 12, avoiding bidders who consistently bid
extreme values such as zero. The summary statistics of the bids of the 12 selected bidders are
shown below.
[Table 2 here]
We then sorted the selected bids in each trial from low value to high value, and used the four
lowest and four highest bids in each trial for the LOW and HIGH treatment of stage 2, as is
explained next.
Stage 2
Stage 2 was similar to stage 1. That is, participants are asked to bid for listening to the same
unpleasant high-pitched tone on a headset as in stage 1. Again, participants were first exposed
to the tone, and only then asked to place a bid. However, in stage 2 subjects participated in a
second price auction, instead of the BDM procedure used in Stage 1. In the instructions, the
notion of second price auction was explained, and it was clarified that it is an incentive
compatible mechanism, meaning that their best strategy is to state their true value. Subjects
were told they are about to participate in several trials of second price auction against four
other bidders, and that these bidders already placed their bids a few days earlier. The
instructions followed: "In order to become familiar with the task, bids in the first round will be
displayed to you momentarily.. .you will start bidding only in the second round."
Hence, starting in the second round subjects were asked to place their bid, i.e., to state the
minimum amount of money they demand in order to listen to the same tone again (WTA). If the
subject won the auction, she listened to the tone and earned the second-lowest bid in the
auction (equal or greater than her bid). After each auction, the other four bids were shown to
the subject. This procedure was repeated nine times, to complete ten trials.
We had two treatments -- HIGH and LOW: in each trial subjects participated in a second price
auction against either the four highest (HIGH treatment) or four lowest (LOW treatment) bids of
retained bids for the same trial in stage 1. For example, in the first trial the participating bids in
the HIGH treatment were [100, 99, 60, 80], and in the LOW treatment were [20, 25, 5, 20]. In
subsequent trials (trial 2 through 10) the set of bids retained from stage 1 in each treatment
(HIGH and LOW) was very similar to the bids shown above.
At the end of stage 2 we asked for feedback, asking the subjects what was their bidding
strategy. Out of the 23 participants who participated part in stage 2, one indicated s/he did not
understand the auction and was confused. Another indicated s/he was testing the program to
see whether the study was for real by, for instance, bidding 500 in one trial. As a result, we
exclude these two participants when analyzing the data.
The results of Stage 2 are shown in Figure 1 with mean bids in HIGH and LOW treatments, and
Table 3 showing these differences are significant in all trials (p<.03).
[Figure 1 Here]
[Table 3 Here]
Discussion
Our question is whether looking at other people's pricing decisions is a type of heuristic, a
decision rule that people over-apply even when it is not applicable - such as in the case of
clearly private value goods. We find evidence that this is indeed the case - individual valuation
of a purely subjective experience is highly influenced by others' value.
These results might be useful when thinking about value formation and pricing in actual
markets. If valuations of others affect individual's valuation this can lead to rigidities (of price or
quantities), and create seemingly common value even in the absence of one, as in the case of
fashion. This adds an aspect to firm-consumer interaction and gives an additional explanation as
for why firms hire experts or public-opinion shapers. Beyond the role of information: firms may
hire experts or public-opinion shapers to generate consumers' value and, in turn, economic
rents.
This view of interrelated private valuation not only has interesting Industrial Organization and
Marketing implications, as described above, but also Macroeconomics ones. For instance,
interrelated private valuation can help explain the origins of nominal rigidities: consumers who
cannot translate their valuation into monetary units, as is the case in our experiment, may rely
on prices others are willing to pay. In such a case prices will be sticky.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Average S.d. Min Max
Trial 1 41 37 0 100
Trial 2 37 34 0 100
Trial 3 36 33 0 100
Trial 4 32 28 0 100
Trial 5 35 33 0 100
Trial 6 31 29 0 100
Trial 7 35 32 0 100
Trial 8 34 31 0 100
Trial 9 34 30 0 100
Trial 10 33 32 0 100
Overall 35 32 0 100
Table 2: Selection
Average S.d. Min Max
Trial 1 49 32 5 100
Trial 2 43 27 15 100
Trial 3 42 27 15 95
Trial 4 39 22 10 80
Trial 5 41 28 10 95
Trial 6 38 26 10 80
Trial 7 42 27 5 80
Trial 8 42 26 5 77
Trial 9 40 24 5 77
Trial 10 43 30 1 90
Overall 42 26 1 100
Table 3: Main Results
HIGH LOW p-val
Trial 2 37.3 11.7 0.022
Trial 3 30.5 9.2 0.015
Trial 4 28.9 11.3 0.027
Trial 5 27.4 9.9 0.015
Trial 6 28.1 8.7 0.009
Trial 7 26.6 8.4 0.011
Trial 8 27.1 10.6 0.025
Trial 9 28.5 8.9 0.010
Trial 10 26.5 8.2 0.019
Overall 28.97 9.65
Figure 1: Main Results
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Abstract
This paper develops a model of slow macroeconomic adjustment to monetary shocks. I pro-
ceed in three steps. First, I develop a mechanism for price rigidities. My mechanism captures
the notion that firms are reluctant to increase prices after an increase in demand or costs be-
cause it creates a disproportionate adverse reaction among consumers. These reactions arise
endogenously for purely informational reasons. The key assumption is that some consumers are
better informed than others about monetary shocks. If few consumers are informed, equilibria
with nominal rigidity exist. In these equilibria firms do not change prices even though they
are arbitrarily well informed, and have no menu costs. Moreover, if the proportion of informed
consumers is low enough, these equilibria dominate equilibria with flexible prices. Second, I
show that when firms do not change prices they inflict an informational externality on other
firms. Consumers buy goods sequentially, one after the other, and change their beliefs about
shocks when they see prices change. Therefore, when firms do not change prices, consumers do
not learn. This hurts both firms and consumers. Third, I study the dynamic responses of output
and inflation to shocks. Because of the informational externality learning is initially slow, the
responses are delayed and hump-shaped. The responses are also asymmetric - prices increase
faster than they decrease, and therefore negative shocks trigger larger output responses than
positive shocks.
Keywords: signaling, distortion, decentralized trading, islands, dispersed information.
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1 Introduction
There is a long standing idea in economics that, when demand or costs increase, firms are
reluctant to increase prices because it triggers a disproportionate adverse reaction among con-
sumers. According to some authors, this idea could lie at the root of one of the main puzzles
in macroeconomics, namely the existence of nominal price rigidities and real effects of money
Interestingly, when asked to explain their reluctance to increase prices after an increase in costs,
firms' managers usually answer that "price increases cause difficulties with customers" (Blinder
et al. 1998). However, the reasons remain so far unclear. One possible explanation is that, for a
variety of reasons, consumers question whether price increases are justified (Rotemberg 2005) or
exhibit a strong distaste for them (Nakamura and Steinsson 2005; Heidhues and Kdszegi 2005).
One important issue left open by this solution, when considering price increases following an
increase in money, is that rational consumers should understand that these increases are only
nominal, not real. My paper addresses this issue and provides a model in which firms' difficulty
to increase nominal prices arises for purely informational reasons.
I consider a dynamic economy that is subject to exogenous aggregate shocks. The key as-
sumption is that there is heterogeneity of information regarding these shocks among consumers,
some consumers being better informed than others. In my model, firms are able to learn the
realization of shocks from the environment. By letting firms to have arbitrarily precise infor-
mation, and without menu costs, I ask whether they adjust prices. My general goal is to study
how information is transmitted in this economy, and its implications for output and prices. For
concreteness, in this paper I focus on the case of monetary shocks, i.e. changes in the supply of
money, but the basic idea can also be applied to other cases.
The environment is as follows. I consider an economy populated by firms and consumers. In
this economy, goods markets are decentralized. More specifically, the economy is composed of
islands, and on each there is a price-setting firm. Consumers travel from one island to the other,
buying goods sequentially. Importantly, every period, the only price observable to consumers
is the price of the island. After a finite number of periods, all consumers buy a good sold in a
centralized and competitive economy-wide market. In a cash in advance environment, the price
of this good is determined by the supply of money. Thus, this centralized market is meant to
capture the idea that in the long run prices are flexible, and do not reflect any strategic concerns
between suppliers and buyers.
After a monetary shock, an exogenous proportion of consumers learns its realization. At
this point, all other consumers and firms are uninformed. Firms, being so far uninformed, keep
'From the literature it is possible to see that this idea goes back to at least Hall and Hitch (1939), and has been
mentioned by many other authors. For some examples, see Okun (1981); Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986);
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989); Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993); Anderson and Simester (forthcoming).
their price unchanged but sell as much consumers demand. Because every island is visited
by a representative sample of consumers, firms are able to learn the realization of the shock
by observing total demand. This gives rise to an informational asymmetry between firms and
uninformed consumers.
I obtain three sets of results. First, the informational asymmetry between firms and unin-
formed consumers gives rise to an interesting strategic tension. Uninformed consumers revise
their beliefs about money shocks as a function of firms' prices. Firms make higher profits when
consumers believe that monetary shocks are high, because they expect to face higher prices in
the long run, and therefore are willing to spend more in the short run. These two facts lead to
a non existence of equilibria mimicking perfect information when the proportion of informed is
low. For the intuition, suppose that all consumers are uninformed, and that such an equilibrium
exists. In this alleged equilibrium, prices are proportional to money supply - higher after posi-
tive money shocks than after negative shocks, and all consumers update their beliefs from prices.
Thus, consumers spend more after positive shocks, and firms make higher nominal profits. But
this means that when shocks are negative firms have a profitable deviation - to post high prices -
and therefore this is not an equilibrium. Moreover, as it will become clear, the strategic tension
between firms and uninformed consumers changes the nature of price increases, in particular, if
only few consumers are informed, it is harder for firms to implement them.
More formally, because firms have private information, they play signaling games with un-
informed consumers. These signaling games feature pooling equilibria - where the monopolist
posts the same price independently of the realization of the shock - and also separating equilibria
- where the monopolist posts a different price depending on the realization of the shock. If the
proportion of informed is low, separating equilibria do not mimick perfect information alloca-
tions and prices - they are distortionary. If the proportion of informed consumers is low enough,
pooling equilibria exist as well. As a way of comparison, which type of equilibria delivers higher
(ex-ante) profits to the monopolist depends on the proportion of informed consumers. If the
proportion of informed is low, pooling equilibria deliver higher profits. This result holds even if
firms' nominal costs increase when there is a positive monetary shock.
Second, I show that whether firms adjust prices or not, by having an impact on consumer
learning, they inflict an informational externality on other firms. In fact, when consumers see a
price change, they change their beliefs about the state of the world, and this has an impact on
the other firms' cost of changing prices. For instance, firms playing pooling equilibria prevent
consumers from learning, and therefore make it hard to other firms to change prices. This
lack of consumer learning hurts firms' profits, and at the same time reduces consumer welfare.
Interestingly, the degree of price rigidity depends on firms' marginal costs, and there exist policies
capable of improving welfare by bringing the economy closer to perfect information allocations.
More precisely, I show that a temporary tax on monopolists reduces the amount of rigidity,
leading to faster learning among consumers and higher welfare.
Third, the dynamic responses of output and inflation are delayed, hump-shaped, and asym-
metric. In the model, whether firms adjust to prices or not depends on firms' characteristics,
such as firm specific productivity. Therefore, if firms are heterogeneous, some firms adjust
prices before other firms. Price changes allow consumers to learn, and consumer learning makes
other firms adjust prices in future periods. This reinforcement effect between learning and price
changes leads, for a large set of parameter values, to a hump in the response of inflation, because
an increasing number of firms change prices at later stages of the adjustment process.
The model also delivers hump-shaped responses of output. The procyclical effect of money
arises each time an informed consumer buys from a firm playing a pooling equilibrium, for
the usual reason: the informed knows that the price has not adjusted and therefore he buys,
in the case of a positive (negative) monetary shock, more (less) than in the benchmark case.
This means that two forces drive the size of the aggregate effect: the proportion of informed
consumers, and the proportion of firms playing a pooling equilibrium. Initially, as long as the
initial proportion of informed consumers is small, the effect on output is small. As the fraction
of informed consumers increases, this effect grows. However, over time, as the number of firms
playing a pooling equilibrium decreases, the procyclical effect of money dies out, leading to money
neutrality in the long run 2. The asymmetry of the responses of output and inflation relies on the
fact that, in the aggregate, prices adjust faster to positive than to negative shocks, consistent
with the evidence in Peltzman (2000). As a consequence, negative shocks trigger larger output
responses than positive shocks. To summarize, the model delivers delayed, hump-shaped and
asymmetric responses of both output and inflation. The first two characteristics seem consistent
with the data according to Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), and the third according
to Cover (1992).
Related literature. This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, my
paper is complementary to other explanations of the real effects of money through imperfect
information (Lucas 1972; Woodford 2002; Mankiw and Reis 2002; Mackowiak and Wiederholt
2009b; Woodford 2009; among others). Most of these papers develop models where firms are
imperfectly informed. In this literature, the most closely related papers to mine are Reis (2009)
and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009a). Both of these papers develop important DSGE models
where both firms and households have limited information. The mechanism generating rigidity
in these papers is that, because of imperfect information, firms fail to recognize early enough
that they should change prices. My model uses a different mechanism for nominal rigidities,
2A similar dynamic result is obtained by Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009a).
based on the idea that at some point firms have better information than the most uninformed
portion of consumers 3. Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2009) develop a model with aggregate and
firm-specific shocks. Firms learn from demand, and interestingly this leads to transient effects
of money. My setup is more restrictive because I do not allow for firm-specific or idiosyncratic
shocks, which facilitates learning on the side of firms. However, this allows to focus on the type
of rigidity I want to highlight.
Second, my model is closely related to other economies with decentralized markets and private
information (Golosov, Lorenzoni, and Tsyvinski 2009; Duffie and Manso 2007; Amador and Weill
2007). In these models, information about asset values spreads slowly among a population of
traders. In a similar spirit, in my economy information about the aggregate state spreads slowly
among firms and consumers.
Third, my paper is related to the literature on herding behavior. In that literature economies
feature informational externalities in which information gets "trapped", leading to inefficient
outcomes (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992; Chamley and Gale 1994;
Chari and Kehoe 2003). A paper closely related to mine is Gorodnichenko (2009). This paper
presents an interesting and complementary model where informational externalities also play
an important role in delaying learning after monetary shocks. My paper differs in the basic
mechanism leading to nominal rigidity.
Fourth, my paper is also related to other explanation of price stickiness based on "strong"
reactions among consumers to price changes or strategic concerns. Rotemberg has a series of
papers based on the idea of consumer anger (Rotemberg 2005), fairness (Rotemberg 2008),
or other behavioral considerations (Rotemberg 2007) that create stickiness. Nakamura and
Steinsson (2005) develop an interesting repeated game where, due to consumers' habit formation,
firms need to commit to keep their price unchanged for long periods of time. Kimball (1995)
explores a model in which demand curves are more elastic for price increases than for price
decreases. Koszegi and Heidhues (2005) has shown that if consumers perceive price increases as
a loss, firms choose a distribution of prices that exhibits stickiness. Maskin and Tirole (1988)
have shown that oligopolistic competition also leads to price rigidities. My paper targets the
same time of "consumer-based" origin for rigidities, but it differs with previous explanations in
that the friction arising in my model is purely informational.
Finally, my paper is related to the industrial organization literature on prices as signals of
quality (Wolinsky 1983; Bagwell and Riordan 1991). In those models, buyers are unsure about
the quality of products, and therefore the price is a useful signaling device. In my model,
3At a conceptual level, my framework can be thought as an opposite model, in terms of agents' information sets,
to Lucas (1972). In Lucas' framework, sellers do not know the price level, but buyers do. Here, the opposite happens:
sellers know the price level, but some buyers do not.
uninformed buyers are uncertain about the value of goods with respect to goods bought in
future periods. Firms, due to their superior information about the state of the economy, have
information about future nominal prices and therefore they can signal it. A related interesting
paper here is by Kamenica (2008), who presents a model where consumers make inferences on
the basis of product lines.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present a simple static model that shows
the forces at play every time a firm and a group of consumers meet in the dynamic setup. This
static model will illustrate how equilibria with nominal rigidity arise, and characterize them.
In Section 3 I present the main dynamic results using a simple framework. I show that the
fact that firms do not change prices inflicts an externality on other firms. I characterize welfare
improving policies capable of correcting this externality. I then simulate the dynamic responses
of the economy to a monetary shock. Section 4 develops a cash in advance dynamic model, to
show that the insights of the dynamic model can be applied to a monetary framework. Section
5 concludes. Most of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 A Simple Static Model
This simple static model is meant to provide intuition for the main mechanisms at play in the
more involved dynamic framework of the next Section. I consider the problem of a monopolist
selling to uninformed consumers. These consumers buy first the good supplied by the monopolist,
and then buy all other consumption. The price of all other consumption is exogenous, and
can be thought as determined by the long-run macroeconomic state. For instance, after a
monetary expansion, these (nominal) prices increase. Uninformed consumers do not know the
state, implying that they do not know the price of all other consumption, and thus are uncertain
about how much to buy for a given monopolist's price. The main result is that this can lead to
rigidity in the monopolist's price.
More specifically, the setup is as follows. A monopolist sells to a unit mass consumers.
Consumers are heterogeneously informed about the price of other goods in the economy, which
I refer to as the price level. More specifically, consumers are either informed or uninformed.
Informed consumers know the price level, uninformed consumers do not know the price level.
To simplify, in this stark static model, the monopolist is informed and knows the price level4 .
All consumers observe the price posted by the monopolist before making a purchase decision.
Because of this, uninformed consumers are able to update their beliefs about the price level
upon observation of the monopolist's price. The main goal of this section is to show that the
game between the firm and uninformed consumers has pooling equilibria, where the monopolist's
4This assumption will be relaxed in the dynamic model.
price does not depend on the price level, and that these pooling equilibria dominate separating
equilibria, i.e. equilibria where the monopolist's price changes with the price level.
Consumers. There is a unit mass of consumers indexed by i. Consumer i has the following
utility function of consumption:
u(ci) + Ci . (1)
I make the following assumptions concerning the utility function u(ci).
Assumption 1 The utility function u(ci) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable on
R +, increasing, and strictly concave.
The budget constraint is
pci + PCi = Incomei . (2)
Utility (1) is linear in Ci and therefore consumption of good c is independent of income. A
possible interpretation is that spending on c is a small proportion of total income. Under this
interpretation, I refer to good c as a particular consumption good, and to good C as all other
consumption of the individual, and to its price P as a "price level".
Goods c and C are bought sequentially. The consumer first buys good c. Then, the consumer
buys all other consumption C. Consumers buy good c from a monopolist who sets the price p.
P is drawn from a binary probability distribution over 9 {ph, pl}, where ph > Pl. I refer to
p = ph as the high state, and to P = P1 as the low state. I assume that both states are equally
likely: Pr(P = Ph) = Pr(P = Pl) - 1/2. Incomei is consumer i's income.
Information. Informed consumers know the realization of the price level when buying from
the monopolist. There is a proportion a of informed consumers. The complementary proportion
1 - a of consumers is uninformed and does not know the price level when buying from the
monopolist. Uninformed consumers know the distribution of possible realizations. All consumers
know their income when buying from the monopolist. Also, all consumers observe the price set
p when deciding how much to buy from the monopolist.
The monopolist is informed, i.e., he observes the price level before setting his price. Also, to
simplify the analysis, it is assumed the monopolist knows the proportion of informed consumers.
However, the monopolist cannot discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers.
Informed consumers maximize (1) subject to (2) under perfect information. These consumers
know P and maximize their utility without uncertainty.
The monopolist and uninformed consumers play the following one-shot game. First, the
monopolist observes the realization of the price level P. After having observed the price level,
the monopolist posts a price p. Uninformed consumers observe p, form beliefs p about the price
level, and decide how much to demand from the monopolist 5 . Formally, this sequence of events
define a signaling game. The sender of the signaling game is the monopolist. The type of the
sender is defined by referring to different possible information sets he can access 6 . Therefore,
there are two possible types of monopolist: the monopolist who observes a high realization of
the price level, ph, and the monopolist who observes a low realization of the price level, P1. The
message of the sender is the price p. The receiver is the set of uninformed consumers, whose
action is their demand c(.), where i belong to the set of uninformed. This action depends on
beliefs pi.
Monopolist's Problem. The monopolist is able to produce c at zero cost. The monopolist
chooses p to maximize revenues:
maxpc(p, P, pi(p)) (3)
p
where c(.) is total demand for good c, to be derived below. The monopolist sets a price p.
Consumers observe the price p and submit their demand. Then, production takes place, and the
monopolist sells as much as it is demanded. As it will become clear, total demand c(p, P, pi(p))
depends on three objects. First, it depends directly on the price p. Second, it depends on the
price level P, because the demand of informed consumers depends on P. Third, it depends
beliefs held by the uninformed p1i(p), which in turn depend on the monopolist's price p.
Equilibrium definition. I now define a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game between
the monopolist and the uninformed consumers. I first describe the strategy of the monopolist.
I focus on pure strategies. A pure strategy for the monopolist p is a mapping
p : 3 -+ R+ , (4)
that assigns a price p to each state of nature P E T. Next, I describe beliefs pi(p) of a given
uninformed consumer i. I focus on symmetric beliefs of the uninformed. Beliefs are a probability
distribution over 93 defined by a mapping
pi : R+ +[0, 1] (5)
5An interesting related paper here is by Jones and Manuelli (2002), where both the informed buyer and informed
seller problem is considered.6This is the standard definition of "type" in game theory.
that assigns a probability pi(p) to the high state of nature ph. The mapping (5) is consistent
with Bayes' rule on the path of equilibrium play. Because I focus on pure strategies for the
monopolist, the requirement is simply that, for any equilibrium prices (4), denoted p(Ph) and
p(P1) for the high and low states respectively, if p(Ph) # p(Pl) (a separating equilibrium),
then pi(p(Ph)) - 1 and pi(p(Pl)) - 0. If instead p(Ph) _ p(Pl) (a pooling equilibrium), then
Pi (p(Ph- (p(P)) = 1/2. Beliefs pi(p) are unrestricted for other prices.
I now describe the strategy of uninformed consumers. I focus on symmetric pure strategies.
A symmetric pure strategy ci for a given uninformed consumer i is a mapping
ci : R+ x [0, 1] - R++ ,
that assigns a demand ci to each price p and beliefs puti(p). A perfect Bayesian equilibrium
requires that both the firm and the uninformed consumers play a best response. Given this
definitions, I can now define an equilibrium formally.
Definition 1 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a list (p(P),p(p),cj), for all i, such
that
1. There is no profitable deviation from posting p, given consumers' play,
2. pi(p) is derived using Bayes' rule on the equilibrium path,
3. consumption decisions ci maximize utility (1), given the budget constraint (2), beliefs pi(p)
and firm's play.
Having defined an equilibrium of the game, it is now useful to present consumers' optimality
conditions for good c. This will provide intuition for the fundamental strategic tension between
the monopolist and uninformed consumers.
Consumers' Optimality Conditions for good c. In the case of informed consumers,
marginal utility of ci is equated to the relative price of the goods:
,'(ci) = - . (6)
P
This equation (6) pins down the demand for good c by consumer i:
c p .(7)
Notice that because of the quasilinearity of preferences, the demand (7) does not depend on
income.
In the case of uninformed consumers, marginal utility of ci is equated to the expected relative
price of the goods 7:
U'(c ) = E (,) , (8)
where E,,(p) [L] is simply the expectation of relative prices using beliefs pi(p), that is
E [ ] /-Li (P)#i + (1 - (p)) .
Because the expectation E,,(p) [2] is conditional on p (consumer i observes it), the price p
can be taken out of the expectation operator, to obtain the demand function
ci pEtt, () - (9)
At this point, it is important to notice that both the demand of the informed (7) and the
demand of the uninformed (9) depends on the price chosen by the monopolist p times a deflator.
In the case of the informed, this deflator is equal to the inverse of the price level 1/P. In the case
of the uninformed, this deflator is equal to a belief about the inverse of the price level E94(p) [1/P].
Since I focus on symmetric strategies for uninformed consumers, I write total demand as
c(p, P, i(p)) = aci p + (1 - a)cj (pE, (p) . (10)
An interesting feature of (10) is that is it increasing in pi(p). This fact will be key for the form
of equilibria under imperfect information. It implies that the firm prefers uninformed consumers
to believe that the price level is high, because in that case the deflator E,,(,) [!] is low. Notice
that this fact is independent of the state of the world.
2.1 Perfect Information Benchmark
To develop intuition, here I consider a perfect information benchmark where all consumers are
informed, i.e. when a = 1. In this case, total demand is
c(p,P, p7(p)) = ci p . (11)
Plugging (11) into (3), the monopolist's problem becomes
7To get this expression, substitute Income, from (2) into (1) and then take the first order condition with respect to
ci.
maxpci p) (12)
Lemma 1 When all consumers know the value of the price level, the monopolist's price is pro-
portional to the price level and demand is the same in both states of nature.
Proof. Taking the first order condition for the problem (12) and rearranging, get
ci(p~) +p c's) = 0 . (13)
From condition (13) it is easy to see that the monopolist's optimal price is proportional to
the price level. Since total demand depends on the monopolist's price times the realization of
the price level, this demand will be the same in both states of nature.
U
2.2 Heterogeneous Information
In this case, there is a proportion of consumers that do not know the realization of the price
level P, and therefore a < 1. Here I will analyze the equilibria of the game between the firm and
uninformed consumers 8 . I will show that, for low enough values of a this game admits equilibria
with price rigidity, i.e. pooling equilibria in which the firm posts the same price in both states
of the world. I will also show that, for low enough values of a, these equilibria are deliver higher
(ex-ante) profits for the monopolist.
This signaling game belongs to the well-known class of monotonic signaling games (Cho and
Sobel 1990) (the proof is in Appendix A.1). This has two implications. First, the firm is better
off if uninformed customers believe that the state of the world is high, independently of the
actual realization of the state. This characteristic follows from the fact that total demand and
profits are decreasing in uninformed consumers' beliefs, as explained above. Second, the game
has the single-crossing property. This means that the high type is more at ease in posting high
prices than the low type. The reason is that informed consumers know that he is the high type,
8 An interesting, non-strategic, feature of this model without marginal costs is worth highlighting. Suppose no
consumer is informed (a = 0), and fix consumers' beliefs Eg ( [I] = E. Then, to maximize its revenue, the monopolist
posts a price p inversely proportional to consumers' beliefs. To see this, take the first order condition
ci (p7) +p=c' (pE) = 0
which implies that p is inversely proportional to E. The optimality result of pooling equilibria for few informed
consumers presented later in this section hinges on this fact, but is valid even in the presence of marginal costs that
are proportional to the price level P.
and their demand is less sensitive to price increases compared to the demand from the low type's
informed consumers. Together, these two properties make this game tractable.
Signaling games usually have many equilibria, and this game is no exception. I will first
characterize separating equilibria. The following lemma characterizes a benchmark separating
equilibrium, the one where both types get the highest (ex-post) profits possible.
Proposition 1 (Best Separating Equilibrium) The following is the Best Separating Equi-
librium. Define Z by
p1C p =h p( ci ( ph ) + (1 - )c (ph. (14)
Then,
e If a> Y:
- The firm posts the same prices as in the perfect information benchmark:
ph = arg max pci p (15)
p1 = arg max pci p . (16)
For a given equilibrium set of prices p(P), define ex-ante real profits as
1 h 1
l(p(P)) = 2 Phlr(P ) + 2 r(P (17)
where r(P) = pc(p, P, pi(p)). In this case, ex-ante real profits Ul(p(P)) are equal to
ex-ante real profits in the perfect information benchmark:
1 h 1U* 2 Ph 7r(Ph)+2 7 P(8
where 7r(Ph) = maxp pci (p - 1ph) and r(Pl) = maxp pci (p - 1Pi).
* If a< T:
- The firm posts p and ] > Ph s.t.
p c (p P ci (h +(1-a)c (. (19)
In this case, )5 is strictly decreasing and, if u(ci) is such that the profit function is
single-peaked, then U(p(P)) is strictly increasing in a.
PRICES EX-ANTE PROFITS
h
P
p1 1
Figure 1: Best Separating Equilibrium (proposition 1) in the case of a quadratic u(cj).
The proof of this proposition is in the appendix. This lemma shows that when the proportion
of informed consumers is high enough, the high type can separate from the low type by posting
the perfect information prices. The reason is that, in this case, the proportion of informed
consumers is high enough to discourage the low type from imitating him: if the low type posts
ph, the informed know that his price is too high and they buy less than the perfect information
quantity c", hurting the low type's profits. When the proportion of informed is lower, the only
way a separating equilibrium possible is one where the high type posts a price strictly higher
than ph. This makes sure that the low type does not imitate him. Figure 1 is a graphical
illustration of this proposition for the case of a quadratic utility function u(ci). It is shown that
ex-ante profits are increasing in a, and reach II* when a > i.
Having characterized a benchmark separating equilibrium, I will now characterize a bench-
mark pooling equilibrium. Pooling equilibria are interesting for the study of nominal rigidities
since in these equilibria the firm sets the same price independently of the state of the world.
Pooling equilibria exist when the proportion of informed is low. The following proposition
characterizes a benchmark pooling equilibrium. This is the pooling equilibrium at the price cor-
responding to profit maximization when a is equal to zero and no consumer knows the state of
the world. In the dynamic model of Section 4, this equilibrium corresponds to keeping the price
unchanged after a monetary shock. I also show that when a is equal to zero, this equilibrium
reaches the perfect information level of ex-ante profits II*9.
Proposition 2 (p*-pooling Equilibrium) Consider p* s.t.
p* = arg max pci (p [ 1 . i ) , (20)
9This holds also in the presence of marginal costs proportional to the price level P.
PRICES EX-ANTE PROFITS
h
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Figure 2: Best Separating Equilibrium and p*-pooling Equilibrium (Propositions 1 and 2) in the case
of a quadratic u(ci).
and consider a s.t.
p (aci p* + (1 -a)ci [. p h + = arg maxp aci ( + (1 -)ci p
(21)
For a < _a, there exists a pooling equilibrium at p*. Moreover, if a = 0, this equilibrium
reaches ex-ante profits IT*. Also, if u(ci) is such that the profit function is single-peaked, ex-ante
profits II(p*) are strictly decreasing in a.
The proof is in the appendix. When the proportion of informed consumers is low this equi-
librium exists because both types do not want to deviate. In the general equilibrium model this
pooling equilibrium will be particularly interesting because, for a strictly positive proportion of
informed consumers, monetary shocks will have a procyclical effect on demand. Figure 2 is a
graphical illustration of this proposition for the case of a quadratic utility function u(ci). It is
shown that ex-ante profits are increasing in a, and that there is a unique a*** where the ex-ante
profit functions cross.
An interesting feature of this pooling equilibrium is that it yields higher ex-ante profits for
the firm when the proportion of informed consumers is low than any separating equilibrium. The
next proposition develops this result in the case of any utility function satisfying assumption 1.
Proposition 3 If a < a*, the p*-pooling Equilibrium delivers higher ex-ante profits than any
separating equilibrium.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition for this result is the following. There is an ex-ante
trade-off between two possible distortions. The first distortion arises in separating equilibria: in
any separating equilibrium, when the proportion is informed consumers is low enough, there is
a distortion at the top, because the firm needs to post a very high price to be able to credibly
signal the state of the world to uninformed consumers. This distortion hurts ex-ante profits. On
the other hand, another type of distortion arises in pooling equilibria: in any pooling equilibrium
the price posted does not correspond to beliefs of the informed in all states of nature, making
them buy either too much or little with respect to c", the demand under perfect information,
creating a distortion that hurts ex-ante profits. The first type of distortion is bigger the lower the
proportion of informed consumers: in this case, it is easy for the low type to imitate the high type,
and therefore the high type needs to post very high prices to separate. The opposite happens
in the second type of distortion: this distortion is bigger the higher proportion of informed
consumers, in this case the proportion of sales at a wrong price being important. Thus, each of
these distortions varies monotonically but in opposite directions with the proportion of informed
consumers, creating a trade-off for the firm, which favors pooling equilibria when few consumers
are informed, and separating equilibria when many consumers are informed. As shown in the
appendix, this holds even in the presence of marginal costs proportional to the price level P.
A symmetric result follows when the proportion of informed consumers is high enough.
Proposition 4 If a > a**, the Best Separating Equilibrium delivers higher ex-ante profits than
any pooling equilibrium.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition for this result is the same as for the previous
result. There is a trade-off between two types of distortions. The distortion arising in the
Best Separating Equilibrium is small when the proportion of informed consumers a is high, and
therefore in this case this equilibrium ex-ante dominates any pooling equilibrium.
In order to apply this framework to a dynamic study of the responses to a monetary shock, an
issue that I need to confront is equilibrium selection. Given propositions 3 and 4, it is tempting
to pick, for each a, the equilibrium that provides maximum ex-ante real profits to the firm. Thus,
when I study these dynamic responses in the next Section (p. 20) I select, for each proportion
of informed a, among the Best Separating Equilibrium and the p*-equilibrium, the one in which
firms have higher ex-ante profits. This selection criterion can be justified by assuming that the
firm has a commitment device that allows to choose, before the state is realized, a pricing plan.
However, these pricing plans have to be 'credible', i.e. the consumers need reasons to believe
that, ex-post, the firm will keep its promise. In other words, the firm can only commit to prices
that satisfy a PBE and therefore, when the state of the world is low, the firm will not be tempted
to fake that the state of the world is high'0 . This type of criterion is useful for my purposes
given that for the macroeconomic application of this simple model I am specially interested in
'oA formal way of justifying this criterion is to modify the game as in Maskin and Tirole (1992).
pooling equilibria, and a particular pooling equilibrium - the p*-pooling equilibrium - ex-ante
dominates all separating equilibria when the proportion of informed is low11 .
However, it is important to emphasize that the above proposed criterion is not crucial for any
of the dynamic results of Section 3, including the informational externality and the general shape
of the responses to a monetary shock. As long as a non-zero fraction of firms play a pooling
equilibrium, similar results would be obtained. What is crucial is that, for low proportion of
informed a, the pooling equilibrium exists, and that for high values of a only separating equilibria
exist, so that when enough consumers become informed all firms change prices and the economy
returns to steady state. Thus, any selection criterion that allows to have a non-zero fraction of
firms play pooling equilibria would work1 .
2.3 Comparative Statics in the Presence of Marginal Costs
In a more general model, all the cutoffs presented above should depend on firm specific character-
istics. To illustrate this point, let me consider the case where the monopolist has a marginal cost
of production kP. I analyze which among the Best Separating vs. the p*-pooling Equilibrium
are ex-ante optimal. The following numerical result follows.
Result 1 (Optimality of p*-pooling vs. Best Separating Equilibria under Marginal Costs)
Assume u(ci) = aci - 1c, and consider the Best Separating Equilibrium and the p*-pooling equi-
librium. For k < k, there is a < & where both equilibria exist. In this region:
" for a > a***(k), ex-ante profits are higher in the separating equilibrium,
* for a < a***(k), ex-ante profits are higher in the pooling equilibrium.
Moreover, a***(k) is decreasing with k.
As this result shows, which equilibrium delivers higher ex-ante profits depends on firms'
marginal cost kP. The higher k, the lower the critical value of a at which firms prefer playing
separating equilibria. Figure 3 plots this cutoff as a function of k and shows that it is decreasing.
The region below the curve is where pooling equilibria deliver higher ex-ante profits, then region
above the curve is where separating equilibria deliver higher ex-ante profits. The intuition is
that higher marginal costs need to create less of a distortion in separating equilibria.
"In the literature, there is no consensus on how to select equilibria in signaling games. A popular criterion is the
intuitive criterion. However, in a richer model with more states of the world - clearly a relevant extension of this
model for the analysis of monetary policy - this criterion looses its bite - in the sense that it fails to select a unique
equilibrium - and therefore would not be useful (Cho and Kreps 1987, p. 212).
12For instance, if one were to Pareto rank equilibria, this would also favor pooling equilibria for low as and separating
equilibria for high as. The reason is that pooling equilibria are less distortionary in the former case - and thus provide
higher welfare, and separating equilibria in the latter.
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Figure 3: Cutoff a***(k), and regions where p*-pooling/best separating equilibria deliver highest
ex-ante profits (ph - 1 Pl = .9,a = 1).
This result has an interesting application in a macroeconomic model. Indeed, one can write
a model where firms have heterogeneous productivity, giving rise to heterogeneity in k. The
presence of firms playing separating equilibria allows for the possibility of consumer learning.
This, in turn, has implications for the proportion of firms willing to play separating equilibria,
because if the proportion of informed is higher, according to the above result the Best Sepa-
rating Equilibrium is more profitable when the proportion of informed is higher, or according
to Proposition 2, the p*-equilibrium stops existing. Thus, it seems, a dynamic model can de-
liver interesting feedback effects between learning and the proportion of firms playing separating
equilibria. I explore these themes in the next section.
3 Dynamics Under Heterogeneous Information
In this Section I present and discuss the main dynamic implications of the nominal rigidity
developed in Section 2. The discussion will be centered around the informational implications
of pooling and separating equilibria. As explained above, uninformed consumers learn the state
of the world by observing firms' prices. Therefore, whether firms change prices or not has
informational implications for consumers, and therefore, in a dynamic setting, has implications
for price setting of other firms. Thus, a given pricing strategy of firms creates an externality on
other firms. In particular, firms playing pooling equilibria prevent consumers from learning the
state of the world. I first discuss the normative implications and then positive implications of
this externality.
3.1 Simple Dynamic Setup
For presentational purposes here I present a simple dynamic setup. This is a simplified version
of more involved model of next Section.
Time is discrete, indexed by t, and runs from t = 1 to a final period t = T + 1. There is
a unit mass of consumers. Consumers enter this economy with an initial amount of cash Mo.
Consumers buy an initial set of goods c1 , ... , cr using credit, and a good cT+1 using cash.
An exogenous monetary shock v occurs. This shock is a transfer to consumers' cash holdings,
whose value is stochastic and observed by consumers only at T+ 1. The sum of the initial amount
of cash and the transfer is equal to money supply M:
M = Mo + v
which is high (Mh) or low (M), both outcomes equally likely. An exogenous proportion ai
of consumers learns the amount of the transfer at t = 1.
This economy is divided into a unit mass of islands. On every island there is a firm. This
firm is a monopolist on the island and sets a price. In this simple dynamic model firms have
perfect information and know money supply M. This assumption is relaxed in the more explicit
model of Section 4, where an additional initial period is introduced where firms can learn M by
observing the amount of sales. This reveals M because of the proportion of informed consumers
1.
Consumption happens in the following way. Each consumer buys goods c1, ... , CT sequen-
tially, one after the other, and on a different island each time. More specifically, consumers are
divided into representative samples of unit mass. Every period t, each of these samples is sent
to a different island for consumption13
All firms produce the same good ct, which is the consumption good of period t. Firm located
in island j produces this good with a linear technology of labor
ct = Aj Lt .
In the final period T+ 1, consumers receive the cash transfer, and then buy a good CT+1 sold
by an economy-wide competitive firm. Utility is linear in this good. The price of this good, P,
is proportional to total money supply M. Firms hire labor from an economy-wide competitive
market at a wage14 W, also proportional to money supply M.
13There is a unit mass of these samples.
141n Section 4 I show that, after a normalization, P = W = M in a cash in advance general equilibrium model.
3.2 Informational Externality
I now analyze the normative implications of the nominal rigidity presented in Section 2. Recall
that uninformed consumers learn the state of the world by observing firms' prices. Therefore,
firms that play a pooling equilibrium will prevent consumers from learning. In this dynamic
setting, this inflict an informational externality on firms in the next period. Here I show that
this type of informational externality hurts firms' profits and reduces consumers' welfare over
periods t= 1, ... T + 1.
For the purpose of the analysis of the informational externality, I will suppose, without loss
of generality, that all firms are identical, thus Aj = A for all j (there is need to relax this
assumption to analyze the positive implications of the model, see below). This homogeneity
assumption implies that all firms have the same marginal costs of production kW = W.
Suppose that the initial exogenous proportion of informed consumers a1 is low enough so that
the p*-equilibrium exists, and that it is played at least on some islands at t = 1. The following
proposition states that in this case firms' (ex-ante) profits and consumers' (ex-ante) welfare are
lower than under perfect information.
Proposition 5 (Welfare Effect of Informational Externality) Assume 0 < ai < a(k)
and that at least on one island the p*-equilibrium is played at time t = 1. Then, if the profit
function is single-peaked, the sum of firms' ex-ante profits over t = 1,... ,T + 1 is lower than
under perfect information. Moreover, if u(ci) is quadratic, the sum of consumers' ex-ante welfare
over t = 1,... , T + 1 is lower than under perfect information.
The proof is in the appendix. Intuitively, the profit loss comes from the presence of a non-
zero proportion of informed consumers. Firms' prices are not optimal for this segment of the
market, leading to a loss in profits. The welfare loss comes from the informed consumers as well:
their consumption varies across states, and given the concavity of the utility function u(xi) and
linearity of marginal utility, by Jensen's inequality ex-ante welfare is lower. Perhaps surprisingly,
uninformed consumers have the same ex-ante welfare as in the perfect information benchmark.
The reason is that the price p* corresponds to their belief and therefore their consumption bundle
is not distorted.
Notice also that in the situation described by Proposition 5, some firms do not change prices
and uninformed consumers buying from them do not learn. Since all firms are identical, if no
firm changes its price, this is an extreme example in which information gets "trapped" forever
and the economy does not return to its benchmark level production even if T is arbitrarily large.
This result has the flavor of an information cascade ' la Banerjee (1992) or Bikhchandani et al.
(1992), where informational "cascades" prevent agents from fully aggregating information in the
long run.
Interestingly, in this model nominal rigidity is endogenous and, as shown previously, depends
on firms' productivity A and by implication on its marginal cost kW. Thus, it is possible to make
prices more flexible using a tax proportional to sales. The tax can increase profits and welfare
by allowing uninformed consumers to learn. The following proposition makes this statement
precise.
Proposition 6 (Welfare Improving Policy) Assume 0 < a1 <; _g(k) and that at least on
one island the p*-equilibrium is played at period t = 1. Then, if T is big enough and the profit
function is single-peaked, a social planner can increase the sum of firms' ex-ante profits over
t = 1,... , T + 1 by implementing a proportional tax rate OP on firms' sales at period t = 1. If
u(ci) is quadratic, the social planner can increase the sum of welfare over t = 1,... ,T + 1 as
well.
Proof (sketch). Consider 0 financed lump-sum s.t. pooling equilibria do not exist anymore
and therefore all firms play a separating equilibrium at t = 1. Then, from t = 2 on, the economy
is in perfect information and ex-ante welfare is maximum. Thus, if T is big enough, this policy
improves the sum of welfare over all periods.
U
In the presence of marginal costs of production, the cutoff a(k) for existence of pooling
equilibria depends on the parameter k (equivalently on productivity A). This cutoff is decreasing
in k. A tax V)P increases firms marginal costs and therefore, for high enough '0 only separating
equilibria exist. Thus, all consumers learn at t = 1. From t = 2 on the economy is in perfect
information, profits and consumer welfare are higher.
3.3 Learning Dynamics and Responses of the Economy to Mon-
etary Shocks
I now analyze the positive implications of the nominal rigidity presented in Section 2. In par-
ticular, I will describe the dynamics of learning, output, and prices. These dynamics are meant
to represent the responses of the economy to a monetary shock in an infinite horizon model, as
the one developed in the next Section.
One of the issues highlighted when describing the normative implications of the informational
externality is that, if the exogenous initial proportion of informed consumers is low, firms are
homogeneous and equilibrium selection is such that no firm changes its price, then consumers
never learn. This implies that the economy is stuck in an equilibrium in which there is no
adjustment back to the perfect information level of production. To solve this issue, and allow
for learning for arbitrarily low initial proportion of informed, I introduce firm heterogeneity.
Recall the equilibrium selection criterion proposed in Section 2 - among the Best Separating
Equilibrium and the p*-pooling Equilibrium, pick the one that provides higher ex-ante profits
to the firm. Indeed, as shown by result 1, if the utility function is quadratic, according to this
criterion the cutoff at which firms change prices depends on firms' productivity. In an economy
where firm heterogeneity gives rise to different Aj across firms, low productivity firms change
prices for lower proportion of informed consumers. This allows consumers buying from those
firms to learn the state, and therefore the proportion of informed consumers is always increasing
over time. It is important to notice that the use of the equilibrium selection criterion proposed
in the last Section is not crucial for this result, and all other results in this Section. Indeed,
it is possible to show that all cutoffs a, a, a*, a**, and a*** presented in Section 2 depend on
firm productivity, and more generally on other firm specific characteristics. In particular, this
is the case for the cutoff of existence of pooling equilibria a, and thus this equilibrium would
exist or not for a particular firm, and this can be used to generate consumer learning. What is
important is only that, when it exists, it is not completely ruled out for some firms.
To illustrate consumer learning under heterogeneity, Figure 4 plots the evolution of the
proportion of informed consumers (at) for a small initial (exogenous) proportion of informed
consumers (6 percent). The ratio of money supply M in the two states of the world is equal
to Ml/Mh = .95, and the number of periods is 13 (T = 12). The dynamics of learning are
the same in the case of a positive or negative monetary shock. The Figure shows that learning
is slow at the beginning, and accelerates, leading, in the case of these parameter values, to a
convex curve. Let me now turn to the evolution of the proportion of firms with rigid prices. In
a benchmark case where the proportion of firms playing the separating equilibrium is constant,
this curve would be concave, as consumers would learn at a constant rate, with fast learning
at the beginning, and slow learning towards the end. However, generally, the proportion of
firms playing the separating equilibrium is increasing over time. To illustrate, Figure 5 plots
the proportion of firms playing the pooling equilibrium. Thus, learning is generally slow at the
beginning and it accelerates towards the end, leading to a convex curve. The reason for this
is the informational externality in the model. As learning increases, the separating equilibrium
becomes more attractive and more firms play it. This increases the rate at which consumers
learn. Therefore, there is a positive feedback effect between learning and the proportion of firms
playing the separating equilibrium which tends to be convex. This feature is relatively robust to
using other parameter values.
The dynamic responses of output the economy are determined by the two forces represented in
Figures 4 and 5. Each time an informed consumer buys from a firm playing a pooling equilibrium
he creates a procyclical effect of money, i.e. higher output than under perfect information when
money supply is high, and lower otherwise. Thus, one the hand, other things equal the higher the
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Figure 5: Proportion of firms playing the p*-pooling equilibrium
proportion of informed, the stronger this effect. On the one other hand, the lower the proportion
of firms pooling, the weaker this effect. It is clear that in the long run the fraction firms pooling
is zero, and therefore the effect dies out, and the economy returns to the benchmark level of
output (informed consumers buying from firms setting perfect information prices do not create
a procyclical effect of money). Therefore, as long as there is an initial effect, it will be dampened
in the long run. If the initial proportion of informed if small, the effect will be initially and
arbitrarily small as well. Thus, learning can create a hump-shaped effect of output, a feature
that is shown in Figure 6 as percentage deviations from the perfect information benchmark.
This feature is pretty robust to other parameter values. The model is clearly too stylized to
be brought to the data, but it is interesting to note the resemblance of these dynamics with its
empirical counterparts (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005).
Another feature worth highlighting, regarding the responses of output, is that they are asym-
metric - the response is bigger (in absolute value) and arrives a bit earlier when the when the
shock is negative. In the case of a negative shock, the effect peaks at around -3 percent, whereas
in the case of a positive shock, it peaks at around 2.5 percent.The reason is that sometimes firms
increase prices and create a distortion that decreases sales below the benchmark level. This
happens when at has not yet reached a, the cutoff for having separating equilibria replicating
perfect information (see proposition 1)15. This asymmetry in the responses to money shocks is
interesting and has been found in the data (Cover 1992).
I now describe the dynamics of prices and inflation. Prices are increasing in the case of
high money supply and decreasing in the case of low money supply. This is shown in Figure
7. Notice also that the effect is delayed significantly - as it is in the case of output - because
learning is slow at the beginning. This leads to responses of inflation that hump-shaped because,
as long as the initial proportion of informed consumers is low enough, the proportion of firms
changing prices is increasing over time16. More precisely, if the distribution of 'real marginal
costs' kg = 1/A is uniform, if the learning curve is convex, the proportion of firms playing a
pooling equilibrium has a decreasing slope over time, and there is a hump in inflation. This is
the case in this simulation, and this feature is robust to other parameter values. Notice also that
the dynamics of prices and inflation are asymmetric. In particular, prices adjust faster in the
high state, consistent a response of output that is smaller than in the low state.
To summarize, the model delivers interesting responses of both output and inflation. In the
"The reason this effect is small and only leads to a slightly dampened positive shock is that only a few firms cause it,
precisely because, according to the selection criterion used firms avoid this distortion. I have experimented with many
parameter values and I have never found that this effect dominates, leading positive shocks to have negative effects on
output.
16This is related to an interesting paper by Cavallo (2009) who, using daily frequency data on price changes, finds
empirical evidence that firms synchronize price changes.
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data, these responses have been estimated as delayed and hump-shaped as well. In the model,
the informational externality and the implied the slow nature of learning deliver naturally these
features, as long as the initial proportion of informed consumers is small.
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4 The Dynamic Cash in Advance Framework
The goal of this Section is to show that the simple dynamic model of last Section is compatible
with a cash in advance, general equilibrium, framework.
In this model money has an explicit role due to a standard cash in advance constraint (Lucas
and Stokey 1987). In each island there is a price-setting firm. Firms are heterogeneous in
that they will have different productivity levels. As shown by Result 1, heterogeneity implies
that after a monetary shock firms with low productivity change prices earlier. Consumers learn
endogenously from these price changes. As consumers become informed, more and more firms
change prices, slowly bringing the economy to a long run equilibrium.
Time. Time is discreet and every period indexed by t = 0,.... Every period is subdivided
into N + 2 subperiods, indexed by r = 0,1,... , N + 1. For the analysis of the dynamics after a
monetary transfer, I am interested in the dynamics across subperiods.
Geography. There is a unit mass of islands indexed by either j E [0, 1]. Every island there is
populated by a unit mass of households, indexed by i. Therefore, a household in this economy
is identified by a double index ij. On every island, households own a firm that produces a
consumption good c. The firm is a monopolist on the island where it operates. Each one of
these firms produce the same good.
Shoppers and Workers. Every household is divided into a shopper and a worker.
Consumption. In the first N +1 subperiods of every period t shoppers are randomly sent to
islands for consumption of goods c,. Therefore, in every subperiod T < N + 1, every monopolist
receives a new mass of shoppers that demand good c,. Goods c, are sold by the monopolists on
credit. For this reason, in the rest of the paper I will refer to these goods as credit goods. In the
last subperiod N + 2 of every period t, shoppers buy a cash good C from a centralized, repre-
sentative competitive firm. As in the partial equilibrium model, goods bought in decentralized
markets - credit goods - are denoted in lowercase, and goods bought in centralized markets -
the cash good - are denoted in uppercase. As it will become clear, goods bought in centralized
markets will have prices that will be proportional to the money supply at all times and will be
denoted in uppercase. (Goods bought in decentralized markets need not have prices proportional
to the money supply at all times, and will be denoted in lowercase.)
Goods and Labor Markets. Goods c, are sold on every island by a price-setting monop-
olist. Good C is sold in a centralized competitive market by a representative firm. There is a
centralized competitive labor market where all workers supply labor L. Because labor is supplied
in a centralized market it is denoted in uppercase. All firms in the economy hire labor from this
market.
Timing and Information Assumptions. At the beginning of every period t there is a
monetary transfer vt into the economy. I will refer to vt as the "monetary transfer" or the "mon-
etary shock" interchangeably. This monetary transfer is not immediately revealed to households.
At the first subperiod r = 0, every island receives a representative sample of shoppers in the
economy. An exogenous proportion of shoppers aot knows the monetary transfer vt when buying
credit good co. The complementary proportion 1 - aot does not know the transfer when buying
the credit good. In this period, firms are uninformed, but can learn the state by observing total
demand.
At every subperiod T = 1, ... , N, again, every island receives a representative sample of
shoppers in the economy. In the first subperiod r = 1, the proportion of ait knows the monetary
transfer vt when buying credit good c1. The complementary proportion 1 - ait does not know
the transfer when buying the credit good. At this point firms are informed about the monetary
shock, and therefore, on some islands it is possible to learn the monetary transfer from prices
set by monopolists. Therefore, the proportion of shoppers that know the monetary shock grows
endogenously: a2t > alt, and more generally, ar+1t > at, T = 1,. . . , N.
Meanwhile, workers supply labor in the centralized labor market. In equilibrium the wage
Wt is perfectly flexible and proportional to the money supply, and for this reason, the wage
immediately reveals the transfer to workers.
At the last subperiod r = N + 1, each shopper receives the monetary transfer vt and buys
the cash good C using cash in a centralized market. At the end of the period, the worker comes
back home bringing labor income, the household pays consumption of credit goods, profits from
firms are received, and financial markets open. At this point, all agents in the economy know
the monetary transfer vt. This implies that all agents know the money supply in the economy.
Games Between Monopolists and Uninformed Shoppers. Every time a particular
informed firm and a sample of the shoppers population are matched, the firm and the proportion
of uninformed shoppers play the following signalling game. Firms' type is determines by the
monetary shock vt. Therefore, there two possible types for the firm: the "high" type, i.e. the
firm that observed a high monetary shock; and the "low" type, i.e. the firm that observed a
low monetary shock. After observing the monetary shock, the firm posts a price pjyt in a store
for the good it sells. Uninformed shoppers observe this price, form beliefs about the monetary
shock p(pjrt), and decide how much to demand 7. Notice that shoppers and firms are matched
at every subperiod rt, and also that an infinite number of these matches happen at every -rt.
Stochastic Process for Money. Money supply evolves as:
log Mt = log Mt-I + vt , (22)
where vt is shock that can take two values, vh > 0 or vI < 0, both outcomes with equal probability.
I further impose that
E[e-'] =1 . (23)
This centering assumption implies that the the inverse of the money supply, which I interpret
as the real value of a 1 dollar bill, is a martingale:
E =E = . (24)
MA Mt_1 Mt_1
This assumption will be convenient when characterizing the equilibria of the games played
between the monopolists and the shoppers.
Households' Problem. Household i of island j faces the problem
oo N~
max Ei37t (Z/t (u(cist)+v(Cit) - Lit , (25)
It=0 (-=0
where cijrt is consumption of good x at subperiod r time t, produced by a randomly matched
firm j of island j, Cijt is consumption of the credit good, and Lijt is labor supplied by the worker.
j(i, j, r, t) is a function designates the firm j, that sells to household ij at subperiod T time t.
Eijrt is an expectation that is taken at different stages of each period, and using the relevant
decision maker's (shopper or worker) specific information set. This maximization is subject to
the budget constraint
N
(p cir+ PtCijt + Mijt + Bit = (1 + Rt)Bit- + M -1 + i + WLit + siljt , (26)
r=1
17Notice that all uninformed consumers play the same strategy, and therefore have the same beliefs about the
monetary shock.
where Ft is a lump-sum transfer consistent with the process of money18
The cash-in-advance constraint for consumption of good y is
PtCijt < Mijt-i + FIt . (27)
At this point it is important to notice that households' preferences are quasilinear. By elimi-
nating wealth effects on household choices, this assumption simplifies the analysis in three ways.
First, similar to Lagos and Wright (1995), it allows to handle the heterogeneity in households'
information. These heterogeneity causes different shoppers to make different choices for credit
goods c,. However, the absence of wealth effects implies that all other choices are homogenous
across households, and therefore the cross-sectional distribution of money and bond holdings col-
lapses into a degenerate distribution. For this reason, I do not need to keep track of it. A second
implication of the absence of wealth effects is that there is no option value in waiting to gather
more information before consuming credit goods, which simplifies the games between firms and
shoppers enormously. Third, linearity in labor supply implies that every set of equilibria of these
games is consistent with a general equilibrium in which the labor market clears.
Monopolists. On every island j there is a monopolist that produces good c, using technology
cjrt= AjLjrt (28)
where Ljyt is labor hired by firm j at subperiod rt. Firms are heterogenous with respect to their
productivity. Write the firm's real marginal costs as
Wt
k=- , (29)
Aj
where Wt is the nominal wage. I assume that firm heterogeneity is such that there is a distribution
A3 that yields a uniform distribution of real marginal costs
kj ~ U[0, a] . (30)
Representative Firm Producing C. There is a representative firm that hires labor and
produces good C according to a simple linear technology. The labor productivity if this firm is
normalized to 1:
C=L.
18More specifically, D~t is such that i = Mt - Mt_ 1. I will show that since in equilibrium all agents have the same
money holdings and therefore this way of defining the transfer is possible.
Definition of Equilibrium. A general equilibrium of this economy are allocations {ci,-t, Cjt},
beliefs pijrt(pjrt), labor supply decisions {Lijt}, prices {pjrt, Pt}, nominal wages, {Wt}, interest
rates {1 + Rt}, for all i, j, r, t, s.t.
1. The households' conditions for optimality and associated constraints are satisfied;
2. the equilibrium strategies for the games played between monopolists and shoppers satisfy
Bayesian Perfection:
" monopolists post prices to maximize profits, given consumers' play,
* uninformed shoppers use Bayes' rule on the path of equilibrium play,
" shoppers' demand satisfies the condition for optimality;
3. the representative firm maximizes profits taking the price as given;
4. goods, labor, bonds, and money markets clear.
4.1 General Equilibrium.
Household ij's Optimality Conditions. The conditions for optimality are computed as
follows. Each time the shopper of household ij is matched with a monopolist, he observed the
price that was posted and computes the first order condition for consumption of the good sold
by the monopolist:
#3u(cirt) = pI,,E [At) . (31)
Eig t[.] is an expectation computed using the shopper's information set. This information
set contains information he has previously collected plus the information revealed by the price
of the monopolist.
When the shopper finally arrives to buy the cash good, he computes a first order condition
for consumption of this cash good after observing its price. This good is sold by a representative
competitive firm in a centralized market, and therefore its price reveals the realization of the
monetary shock to the shopper, in case he did not know it already. Therefore, at this point the
shopper does not face any uncertainty, and the first order condition is:
/'o'(Cijt) = Pt(Ait + ?/ijt) . (32)
The worker arrives at the market for labor and computes a first order condition for labor
supply after observing the equilibrium wage. This is a centralized and competitive market, and
therefore this wage reveals the realization of the monetary shock to the worker. Therefore, the
worker does not face any uncertainty, and the first order condition is:
(33)
The first order condition for money holdings is computed at financial markets at the end of
the period, and therefore under perfect information:
Aijt = Et[Aijt+1 + oist+1 ] (34)
The first order condition for bond holdings is also computed under perfect information:
Aijt = (1 + Rt+1)Et[Aijt+1] . (35)
Cash Good and Labor Markets. It is possible to show that every set of PBE of the
games played between monopolists and shoppers is consistent with a general equilibrium. The
reason is the linearity in the disutility of labor, which implies that individual labor choices are
always consistent with the resource constraint of the economy.
In equilibrium, the price of the cash good C is pinned down by the cash in advance constraint,
and therefore it is proportional to the money supply. Optimality of production for the represen-
tative firm producing the cash good immediately implies that the wage Wt is also proportional
to the money supply Mt. After a normalization, we have that all of these three quantities are
always equal:
Pt = Wt = Mt .(36)
Also, the nominal interest rate is determined in expectations of next period's shock, and
therefore always constant. Consumption of the credit good is also constant every period.
Demand for Credit Good crt by Shopper ij. Substituting (33) into (31):
u'(cijrt) = pg Et" [M-t . (37)
From this equation get the demand:
cij-rt (p3-rE1-ijr .M (38)
As in the partial equilibrium model of section 2, the demand for credit goods depends on a
deflated version of the price posted by firms. Here, the deflator is a belief about the inverse of
the real value of a unit of money, and therefore the consumer basically transforms the nominal
price posted by the monopolist into a real price. If this estimate is low (corresponding to a
0' = Wt Aijt
belief that the supply of money is high), a given nominal price is deflates into a low real price,
increasing the shopper's demand. As it will become clear, this effect will limit firms credibility
to signal that there has been a high monetary shock in the economy.
Aggregate Demand for crt. At every subperiod rt a proportion art of shoppers know the
monetary aggregate. Therefore, the aggregate demand is
Ci rt (p, Mt, pigst didj = arrtcijr t + ( - art)cijrt pt - Ey (pgdt
whrM i(Pjt~id A (1-atcj P jP~~ ii)(39)
where M, E [0, 1 x [0, 1] is the subset of consumers matched with firm j at subperiod Tt. A
proportion at of the shoppers arriving to firm j will know the monetary aggregate and therefore
will have the correct beliefs, and the complementary proportion will form beliefs using Bayes'
rule on the equilibrium path.
At this point, notice that the total demand (39) that every firm faces is the same as (10) in
Section 2. This shows that result 1 applies in the case of this cash in advance model19 . Also, all
the dynamic results of Section 3 apply here. Thus, it is possible to write down a cash in advance
general equilibrium framework compatible with all the results of this paper.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes an explanation to nominal rigidities that is complementary to other ex-
planations based on imperfect information20 . It analyzes an environment where consumers'
information about aggregate shocks is heterogenous. Some consumers are informed while others
are uninformed. In the model, firms can learn the realization of aggregate shocks by observing
total demand. This leads to an asymmetry of information between firms and uninformed con-
sumers. I show that, because of this asymmetry of information, equilibria with rigid prices arise
and are, for some parameter values, more profitable to firms than equilibria with flexible prices.
In these equilibria firms do not change prices even though they have perfect information and
face no menu costs.
This result, together with the strategic tension arising between firms and consumers in my
model, accommodate some anecdotal evidence related to price rigidity. For instance, when asked
about their reluctance to change prices, often firm managers declare to be concerned about
19See page 16.
20For a more detailed exposition of the relationship of my paper with this literature, see page 4.
consumers' reactions to price changes (Blinder 1991). Also, it is customary for firms to justify
the reasons behind price increases or explicitly apologize once an increase has been implemented.
This type of nominal rigidity has interesting normative and positive dynamic implications.
On the normative side, the rigidity leads to an informational externality that hurts firms' prof-
its and reduces consumer welfare. This type of externality has been found on other settings
(Banerjee 1992; Chamley and Gale 1994; Gorodnichenko 2009). I show that a temporary tax
on monopolists reduces the amount of rigidity and improves welfare. On the positive side, the
dynamic responses of output and inflation after a shock are delayed and hump-shaped. The
reason is that initially few consumers know about the shock, but learning accelerates as firms
start changing prices. These features seem consistent with the data (Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans 2005). Moreover, the responses are asymmetric: bigger effects on output for negative
shocks, and faster increase in prices after a positive shock. These asymmetric features also seem
realistic (Cover 1992; Peltzman 2000).
Further extensions of this setup are needed to understand several issues left open. For
instance, a model with a richer type space for monetary policy is a clear extension to understand
how the degree of rigidity changes for different shocks. Also, the cash in advanced setup can
be further enriched. The first extension that comes to mind is staggering of households so
that different set of households make use of financial markets at different times. I leave these
extensions for future work.
A Appendix
A.1 Characterization of the Game.
First, it is necessary to define the following well-known property for a function of two variables.
Definition 2 (Increasing Differences Property) A function f(x, y) has strict increasing
differences in (x, y) if, for x' > x and y' > y,
f (x, y') - f(x, y) < f(x', y') - f(x', y) . (40)
The following lemma shows that under some conditions this game is a standard monotonic
signaling game (Cho and Sobel 1990).
Lemma 2 (Characterization of the Game) If a > 0 and pcj(p -1/P) has increasing differ-
ences in (p, P), this is a monotonic signaling game. It satisfies:
1. Monotonicity.
Let p'(p) and pi(p) be two possible beliefs by the uninformed. If p'(p) > p(p), then, for all
p, pc( p, P, p'i pW) > pc( p, P, Pi( p)).
2. Single-crossing. For any p' > p, we have that, for arbitrary demand by the uninformed,
p'Ic(pl' , , (p)) >! pc(p, Pl, p_,,(p)) =->. p'c(p', t, (p)) > pc(p, ph, /tp))
Proof. I first prove monotonicity, and then single-crossing.
1. Monotonicity. u'(ci) being a strictly decreasing function, the demand of the uninformed
ci(pE, (p) [1/P]) is strictly increasing in pi(p). Therefore, for any p'(p) > p (p), pc'(p, P, p'4(p)) >
pc( p, P, Pi( p).
2. Single-crossing.
Consider p, p', such that p < p', and assume
p'c(p', P, Pi pW) >: pc(p, P, pi p))
This is equivalent to
p'c(p', P, pi(p)) - pc(p, P, i(p)) ;> 0
Since c(p, P, pi(p)) has strict increasing differences in (p, P),
p'c(p', ph /t(p)) _ pc(p, ph [4(p)) > pc(p' F', ,(p)) _ pc(p, F', P, (p)) > 0
and therefore
p'c(p', ph, ,(p)) > pc(p, ph [
U
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The cutoff a is obtained using the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint for the low type (14).
Off equilibrium path beliefs are pi(p) = 0.
Once the cutoff obtained, there are two cases:
e a > -d.
In this case, (14) is satisfied at ph and pl defined by (15) and (16). Firms optimization in
each state yields ph and pl. Therefore, this is the best separating equilibrium. Since in this
outcome consumption is cS", in this outcome ex-ante profits are I1*.
e a < d.
In this case, the IC constraint for the low type is satisfied for a price p defined by (19).
In all separating equilibria the low type posts pi, otherwise he has a profitable deviation.
Moreover, from (14) p is decreasing in a, and therefore Ul(p(P)) is increasing in a.
N
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The cutoff a is obtained from the IC constraint for the high type (21). Off equilibrium path
beliefs are pij(p) = 0. Given this and (21), the IC constraint for the low type
p (ac (P + (1 -- )cp * - + p (aci (p (1 -a)c p
is satisfied Va < a.
I now show that if a = 0, H(p(P)) = 1*. For a = 0,
H(P*) y1 1 pf 2 pJ) 1 1 1 1*ph - I + (41)U~~p*) = 2 Ph p* p ph 2 l 0 lp h p
From the FOC of (20), (15) and (16), notice that
p* [ . 1 /ph + -. 1/Pl =ph. /P -pl 1 / .pl (42)2 2
Also,
ci (* - 1ph + -1/p] =c" (43)
Together, (42) and (43) imply that the right hand side of (41) is equal to H*.
More generally,
fl(p*) = a P *ci P + P * P ) + (1 - a)U* (44)
which is decreasing in a.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
In the case of the best separating equilibrium, H(p(P)) is continuous and strictly increasing in
a. In the case of the p*-pooling equilibrium, from (44) U(p*) is continuous at a = 0, reaches U*
at a = 0, and it is strictly decreasing thereafter. Thus, there is a boundary [0, a*] away from
a = 0 where H(p(P)) is higher in the p*-pooling equilibrium.
E
As argued in the body of the text, this proposition can be extended to the case of marginal
costs proportional to the price level P. It is required that these are low enough so that the firm
makes profits in the high state of the world. As long as a = 0 ex-ante real costs are the same as
under perfect information, and there it is very easy to obtain the alleged result.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Pick a** = d. For a > a**, U(p(P)) = H* in the separating equilibrium. In the pooling
equilibrium, if it exists for a > d, the right hand side (RHS) of (44) is strictly below fl*, and
decreasing.
0
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
The RHS of (44) is strictly smaller than ex-ante profits in the perfect information benchmark,
n*(k). This proves the statement on ex-ante profits.
I will now prove the result on ex-ante welfare. Given separability of the utility function,
consider the case of good ci (the argument is identical in the case of the other goods c2,.. , cT).
The demand for this good is
cri = a - p*E i
In case of uninformed, consumption of good ci in the p*-pooling Equilibrium is
h =: Icri=c 1 = a - p* 2 Ph 2 P1
Because p[ 1/ph + 1 - 1/Pl] = ph . 1 /ph - p1 1/P', c = C1 = c". Thus, in the p*-
pooling Equilibrium, the uninformed get the same ex-ante utility as under perfect information.
In the case of the informed, consumption of good ci in this equilibrium is either
c= a - pi, Th>cS
or
11
ci= a - pi < cs
Using Jensen's inequality, for an informed consumer:
U1i) + u(c1) < u(cs)
Thus, the informed get strictly less ex-ante utility than under perfect information.
Therefore, welfare is strictly smaller than under perfect information.
U
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